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This study examines the factors that correlate with first-term attrition of enlisted Marines 
and officers in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). The data for this study were 
provided by Headquarters Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs for fiscal years 
2001 through 2014. We create two separate multivariate models to identify the causes of 
attrition for both populations. 
The enlisted personnel model used finds that rank and education have the greatest 
effect on the attrition behavior of enlisted Marines, while the Armed Forces Qualification 
Test scores and waiver have the least effect. For officers, rank has the greatest effect on 
the attrition probability, while age and unit type variables have the least effects. 
Numerous other variables under different categories were found to have significant 
effects on Marine SMCR attrition behavior. 
Some variables have different effects on each population, such as marital status. 
This variable is associated with higher attrition rates for enlisted personnel, while it 
decreases the attrition probability of officers. Other variables in this category include 
Physical Fitness Test scores, unit type, and number of dependents. 
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This chapter begins with introducing the purpose of this study and presents 
background. Then, it provides information about the Marine Corps Reserve Component 
(RC) and describes the benefits of the study and research questions. Chapter I concludes 
with the organization of the study. 
A. PURPOSE  
The goal of this study is to determine the factors correlated with first-term 
attrition of enlisted Marines and officers in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). 
Moreover, the question of whether the same set of factors is related to the attrition of 
officers versus enlisted personnel is assessed. This research originates from issues related 
to Marine Corps readiness and increased costs caused by attrition. Attrition increases 
turnover rates which results in loss of experience. So, with a low degree of experience, 
units will be less effective in terms of readiness. The study provides insight to the factors 
contributing to attrition and provides practical steps that can be used to reduce first-term 
attrition. The results are intended to be used by policymakers to reduce personnel 
excesses and shortages that effect costs such as pay, health care, and training.   
The SMCR is a portion of the RC and a primary focus of the thesis. The majority, 
or 77%, of the Selected Reserve (SelRes) is affiliated with the units in the SMCR.1 This 
study also divides the data into different cohorts by the fiscal year to identify whether 
there is a difference in the attrition behavior of the Marine reservists in different years. 
Some disastrous events or other situations during a given fiscal year such as 9/11 or 
unfavorable economic conditions may affect the attrition rate in the SMCR. To assess and 
control for these unforeseen effects, this research makes use of cohort variables. 
Specifically the role of demographic factors like gender and race, educational and 
aptitude scores like Proficiency and Conduct (Pro/Con) marks, and Armed Forces 
                                                 
1 Jonathan D. Price, “Effects of Activation on Selected Marine Corps Reserve Prior Service Enlisted 
Continuation Rates in the Post-9/11 Era” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 1 and 6, 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5437/10Mar_Price.pdf?sequence=1. 
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Qualification Tests (AFQTs) are analyzed, among others. The effects of hometown 
region of Marines and unemployment rates are also examined. 
The data about individual officers and enlisted personnel is provided by 
Headquarters Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs for the years 2001 through 
2014. Data about home state unemployment rates received from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) for the years 2001 through 2014 are also included. 
According to the findings of this research, being married or divorced and having 
above a high school level of education are related to higher attrition probabilities for the 
enlisted Marines in the demographics category. Similarly, having high scores for the 
Physical Fitness Test (PFT) and being in a combat unit increase the attrition probability. 
On the other hand, the following are found to decrease the attrition probability for 
enlisted personnel: having a dependent, older age, higher AFQT scores, possession of a 
waiver, higher rank, and unemployment. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that 
rank and education have the greatest effect on the attrition behavior of enlisted Marines, 
while AFQT scores and waiver have the lowest effect. 
For the officers, the results of the multivariate model suggest that having a 
dependent, having an education level above high school, and being in an aviation unit are 
the factors that increase the attrition probability. However, being married, being an older 
age, having 1st class PFT scores, having a higher rank, and being in a combat unit are 
found to decrease the attrition probability for the officers. For the officers, rank has the 
greatest effect on attrition probability, while age and unit type variables have the least 
effect. 
The comparison of models suggests that some variables have different effects on 
each population. For example, being married is associated with higher attrition 
probabilities for the enlisted personnel while it decreases the attrition probability of 
officers. Higher PFT scores and being in a combat unit are other variables which have the 
opposite results for each population. Similarly, having a dependent decreases the attrition 
probability of the enlisted Marines while it has the opposite effect for the officers. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
The threats that nations face today are volatile and unpredictable. This fact makes 
it imperative for countries to quickly increase the capacity and size of their militaries 
during times of conflict. On the other hand, because stringent budgets are allocated to 
these militaries, they cannot maintain the size of force that is required during times of 
conflict. Hence, it is essential that there be a flexible system that augments the services 
only when required. RC Marines serve this purpose well. Attracting recruits who meet 
Marine Corps standards and keeping them in the RC during their contracted period is 
important to maintain an effective RC. 
After the start of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Marine Corps burden 
increased. This situation increased the importance of Reserves and maintaining the 
manpower needed by the RC. However, in 2007 and 2008, the Marine Corps failed to 
meet the SelRes end strength of 39,600 Marines.2 According to Price, there are two 
possible causes for this failure. First was the “Grow the Force” initiative, which aims to 
increase the number of Marines to 202,000 for the Active Component (AC), and the 
second was the post-9/11-era activations.3 
During this period, the first-term attrition for enlisted and officer reservists 
became a problem for the Marine Corps. The loss of personnel due to attrition means the 
resources invested in initial training are essentially lost. For instance, according to 
Lizarraga’s study, the attrition rate is 10% at the beginning of first-term. However, this 
rate increases to 45% at the Mandatory Drill Participation Stop Date (MDPSD).4 This is 
an important result considering the recent economic conditions and the budget cuts. For 
example, the Marine Corps spent $123 million training Reserve Personnel, which is 28% 
higher than the initially planned budgeted for this purpose.5 Most of this cost is the result 
of the high attrition rate in the Marine Corps.  
                                                 
2 Ibid., 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Joseph M. Lizarraga, “Patterns of Marine Corps Reserve Continuation Behavior: Pre- and Post-9/11” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 6, http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/
10945/5778/11Mar_Lizarraga.pdf?sequence=1. 
5 Ibid., 2. 
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Another result of the attrition problem for the Marine Corps is the negative effect 
of attrition on readiness in the AC. For example, the results of this study show that the 
SMCR loses 57% of its first-term officers and 44% of first-term enlisted personnel prior 
to their MDPSD, which mostly covers a six-year period for enlisted personnel and a four-
year period for officers starting with their contracts. This is consistent with the findings in 
the literature. Lizarraga provides similar information on attrition. He states that average 
attrition rate for non-prior service (NPS) reservists in the SMCR is less than 50% during 
their six-year drilling period.6 Furthermore, according to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) 
Force Policy Letter 1-14 issued in 2013, “Less than 13% of SMCR enlisted Marines who 
reached their mandatory drill stop date during fiscal year (FY) 2013 remain in the SMCR 
today.”7 This rate has been relatively stable in past years. A certain attrition level is 
beneficial for the Marine Corps, because planners can keep the right Marines in the force 
while the others leave the system. However, it is important that the rate does not become 
high enough to affect the combat readiness of the RC. Hence, planners are strategizing to 
keep the right personnel in the Marine Corps and influence them to continue beyond their 
obligated drilling requirements. Considering the magnitude of the problem, if this 
research can identify the causes of attrition in the SMCR, valuable information can be 
given to planners that they can use to reduce the attrition rate and increase the combat 
readiness of the RC. 
C. MARINE CORPS RESERVE COMPONENT 
This section includes succinct and relevant information about the Marine Corps 
Reserve. By knowing the structure and organization of the RC, the problem of attrition 
and continuation decisions of the individuals in the units will be better understood. The 
focus of this thesis is the SMCR, therefore more detailed information will be provided for 
this portion of the RC. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 United States Marine Corps, Fiscal Year 2014 Marine Forces Reserve Retention Offensive, Force 





According to the Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual 
(MCRAMM), the RC is an indispensable part of the Marine Corps, and supports and 
augments the AC during war or national emergency.8 The mission of the RC is “to 
augment and reinforce the AC with trained units and qualified individuals in a time of 
war or national emergency, and at such other times as national security may require.”9 
Detailed information about the RC can be found in the MCRAMM. 
1. Marine Corps Reserve Organization 
The general structure of the Marine Corps RC is shown in Figure 1. RC consists 
of three subunits: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. We describe 
these units in the forthcoming subheadings. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Components of the Marine Corps Reserve10 
                                                 
8 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual (Short 
Title: MCRAMM), Marine Corps Order 1001R.1K, March 2009, 3, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/
Publications/MCO%201001R.1K.pdf. 
9 Ibid., 1–2. 
10 Ibid., 1–6. 
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a. Ready Reserve 
The Ready Reserve is composed of two units: SelRes and the Individual Ready 
Reserve (IRR). SelRes also consists of Active Reserve (AR), SMCR units, and Individual 
Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs). The number and proportions of each component in 
2012 are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Number and Proportions of Each Component11 
 Enlisted Officer Total 






































The units and individuals in the Ready Reserve are those that will serve 
immediate active duty (AD) in case of war or national emergency.12 
(1) Selected Reserve 
The SelRes mainly includes the units and individuals that regularly train and drill 
to support its prospective wartime missions.13 
                                                 
11 United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Budget Estimates, 
April 2013, 13, http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/14pres/RPMC_Book.pdf. 
12 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 1–2. 
13 Price, “Effects of Activation,” 14. 
 7
AR includes the Marines who serve full time. The mission of AR is to support the 
Marine Corps Reserve to maintain its peace and wartime missions. The support includes 
administration, organization, recruiting, instruction, training, and retention of the 
reservists in the Marine Corps Reserve.14 
The SMCR is the most important component of the Ready Reserve. Enlisted 
personnel and officers in the SMCR are obligated to serve under specific contracts which 
will be described in later sections. Marine reservists conduct their monthly drills and 
annual trainings in the SMCR units regularly. Drills are two days (generally one 
weekend) per month and 14 days of annual training. Non-participation or unsatisfactory 
participation in these drills may result in the removal of the service member from the RC 
or involuntary transfer to the Inactive Status List (ISL) in the Standby Reserve for 
officers who completed their Military Service Obligation (MSO).15 The SMCR consists 
of the 4th Marine Division (4th MarDiv), 4th Marine Logistics Group (4th MLG), 4th 
Marine Aircraft Wing (4th MAW), and force-level units of Marine Forces Reserve 
(MARFORRES).16 Because Marines drill regularly only in the SMCR and because the 
SMCR is the most important and active portion of the RC, most research related to 
Marine Reserves, including this thesis, use the SMCR as their population group. 
IMAs are individual reservists who serve in a full-time capacity and are 
preassigned to an AC unit to support the Marine Corps during mobilization.17 These 
Marines also receive training like SMCR units one weekend per month.18 But unlike the 
SMCR, these individuals perform only 12 days of annual training. IMA can be activated 
under the authority of the Deputy Commandant Plans, Policies and Operations as 
                                                 
14 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 1–3. 
15 Price, “Effects of Activation,” 19. 
16 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 1–2.  
17 Ibid., 1–2. 
18 Ibid., 5–3. 
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individuals, rather than units like in the SMCR.19 Generally the contracts of the IMA are 
short term (e.g., one year).20 
(2) Individual Ready Reserve 
The IRR is the largest portion of the Ready Reserve and is a Marine manpower 
pool that includes reservists who have had training and previously served either in the 
SelRes or in the AC.21 For example, most enlisted personnel in the AC sign a 4x4-year 
contract, while in the RC they sign a 6x2-year contract. After they serve the first term of 
their contracts in the AC and SMCR consecutively, the remaining 4- and 2-year periods 
are fulfilled in the IRR.22 Hence, the IRR is the primary unit for Prior Service (PS) 
Marines for recruiting.23 These individuals are primarily available for mobilization. IRR 
includes the reservists who have not completed their MSO or who have completed their 
MSO but remain in the IRR by voluntary agreement. It is also possible to be transferred 
to IRR by authorization without completing the MSO. Reservists in the IRR do not get 
voluntary or involuntary training and are required to muster once per year to meet the 
screening requirements.24 This is the main difference between individuals in the IMA and 
IRR. 
b. Standby Reserve  
The Standby Reserve includes Marine reservists who are unable to meet the 
requirements of the Ready Reserve but who want to keep their affiliation with the RC. 
These individuals may have contractual obligations or may be the officers who “failed to 
resign their commission.”25 The Standby Reserve includes two subunits: Standby 
Reserve-Active Status List (ASL) and Standby Reserve-Inactive Status List (ISL). 
                                                 
19 Price, “Effects of Activation,” 14. 
20 Philip R. Herschelman, “United States Marine Corps Reserve First Term Attrition Characteristics” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 3, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/6807/
12Mar_Herschelman.pdf?sequence=1. 
21 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 1–3. 
22 Herschelman, “United States Marine Corps Reserve,” 3. 
23 Price, “Effects of Activation,” 13. 
24 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 6–4. 
25 Ibid., 1–3. 
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Although these individuals are not part of RC units and they are not required to train, 
they may still be mobilized to meet the manpower requirements of the AC. 
(1) Standby Reserve-Active Status List26 
The individuals in this category are considered to be in active status. Although 
they are eligible for promotion and participate in trainings, they do not receive payment 
or allowances. The reason for them to drill is only for retirement point credits. In case of 
national emergency or war and if the Secretary of Defense approves, the Secretary of the 
Navy can order them to active duty. This active duty status would only be ordered when 
there are not enough qualified Ready Reserve personnel to meet mission requirements. 
(2) Standby Reserve-Inactive Status List27 
This category includes Reserve Marines who are not eligible for promotion, 
payment, or retirement credit and cannot participate in Reserve trainings. Though the 
Reserves in the ASL can be considered for active duty in certain circumstances, 
individuals in the ISL do not have such a role. Currently, the ISL includes officers who 
completed their MSO and failed to meet participation prerequisites to stay in the active 
status but who want to keep the Reserve affiliation.28 The Standby Reserve is not relevant 
to the focus of this thesis. 
c. Retired Reserve 
The Retired Reserve includes four subunits: Fleet Marine Corps Reserve 
(FMCR), Retired Reserve Awaiting Pay, Retired Reserve in Receipt of a Pay, and 
Regular Retired List. The Retired Reserve includes Reserve Marines who requested 
retirement and who were approved.29 Like Standby Reserve, Retired Reserve is also not 
relevant to the scope of this thesis. 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Price, “Effects of Activation,” 16. 
29 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 1–4. 
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2. Accession to the RC 
Most of the Marine officers in the AC chose 4x4-year contracts.30 The first four-
year period means active service in the AC. The remaining four years means MSO, and 
this period is served in the RC, specifically in the SelRes or in the IRR. These officers are 
the primary source of officers for the RC.31 Though this is the major source of officers 
for the RC, these officers are senior in grade and this situation creates the lack of junior 
officers.32  
To address this issue, the Marine Corps employs three Reserve Junior Officer 
Accession Programs. These programs are Meritorious Commissioning Program-Reserve 
(MCP-R), which is available to enlisted personnel; Reserve Enlisted Commissioning 
Program (RECP), which is available to enlisted SMCRs; and Officer Candidate Course-
Reserve (OCC-R), which is available for civilians and enlisted personnel of other 
services and which is the second most common source of SMCR officers. The NPS 
Reserve Officer accessions by programs from 2004 to 2012 are shown in Figure 2.33 As 
shown in the figure, most of the accessions are from OCC-R, while the accessions from 
other programs are very limited. Officers serving under these programs are contracted 
with an eight-year MSO. The first four years are served in the SMCR and the last four 
years are served in the IRR. 
                                                 
30 Philip R. Herschelman, “United States Marine Corps Reserve,” 1. 
31 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 2–2. 
32 Ibid., 2–9. 
33 Anthony D. Licari, “Developing a Markov Model for Forecasting End Strength of Selected Marine 




Figure 2.  NPS Reserve Officer Accessions (FY04–FY12) 
Contrary to officers, the majority of the enlisted personnel are NPS Marines. 
These enlisted Marines constitute 60% of all the RC enlisted personnel.34 Besides NPS 
accessions, another source for the RC for enlisted personnel is the PS Marines. PS 
enlisted Marines join the RC after they serve a certain amount of time in the Marine 
Corps AD. 
The most important difference between the NPS and PS personnel in the RC is 
that PS Marines do not have a service obligation. Contracts in the Ready Reserve only 
require Marines to serve in the Ready Reserve, and PS Marines can leave their SMCR 
units unless contracted specifically otherwise. Since the SMCR is the only part of the 
Ready Reserve which requires Marines to fulfill certain periods of drilling, this enables 
PS Marines to create more instability in the Ready Reserve.35 But these Marines cannot 
get bonuses such as affiliation or reenlistment bonuses or Montgomery GI Bill-Reserve 
(MGIB-R). Also their unstable situation affects their retirement status. 
                                                 
34 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 2–2. 
35 Price, “Effects of Activation,” 5. 
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There are two ways which a civilian can join the RC as an enlisted Marine.36 First 
one is the “National Call to Service.” When a Marine completes the active duty period 
and does not wish to continue on this duty after that time, then the Marine completes the 
remaining period of the contract in the SelRes. The second way is the Reserve Optional 
Enlistment Program (ROEP). The contracts in the ROEP are eight-year contracts and 
consist of two parts. The first part is the three, four, five, or six-year periods. During 
these periods, Marines drill in the SMCR for designated times; the end of this period is 
called the Mandatory Drill Participation Stop Date (MDPSD). The remaining period of 
the MSO can be fulfilled in the IRR. The contract types and descriptions for each are 
shown in Table 2. For the PS enlisted personnel, there are also two options to join the 
RC. These options are the “Platoon Leaders Class” program and “PS Enlisted Personnel 
as SMCR New Accessions.”37  
Table 2.   Contract Types for Enlisted Personnel in the SMCR38 
 
 
The majority of contracts for enlisted personnel in the SMCR, specifically, 97% 
of them,39 are 6x2-year contracts, which is the reason most of the research conducted in 
the SMCR used 6x2-year contracted reservists as their research population. There are two 
possible reasons to warrant the popularity of the 6x2-year contracts. All Marines in the 
RC must sign a contract that requires them to serve in a SMCR unit satisfactorily at least 
six years to be eligible for the enlistment bonus.40 Also a Marine reservist has to agree to 
                                                 
36 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 2–6. 
37 Ibid., 2–7. 
38 Lizarraga, “Patterns of Marine Corps,” 16. 
39 Ibid., 16. 
40 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve Administrative Management Manual, 2–3. 
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serve in the SMCR units for at least six years to receive the Montgomery GI Bill-Reserve 
(MGIB-R), which “is a non-contributory educational assistance benefit available to 
Marines.”41 
Although relatively small in number when compared to 6x2-year contracts, some 
Marine reservists choose to join the SMCR with contracts requiring shorter drilling 
periods. But these contracts cause the RC to lose these reservists in their more 
experienced periods. Nevertheless, some Marine reservists in this group choose to extend 
their drilling periods in order to be eligible for the incentives, such as the MGIB-R.42 
3. Role of Reserves 
As stated in the previous section, the role of the RC is to support and augment the 
AC with trained units and individuals in a time of war or national emergency. This is the 
main and first mission of the Marine Corps Reserve. However, there is another mission 
that is as important as the first mission: the social role of the RC. Once the Marine Corps 
activates the RC and employs the Reserve Units and individuals in a conflict or war, it 
makes a direct connection between American society and the conflicts via individual 
Reserves.43 This makes the American people engaged in the events which are important 
for the national interests and keeps them aware of sensitive issues around the world. 
Between 1973 and 1990, the RC was a “just in case” force under operational 
levels.44 In 1990, with the First Gulf War, Reserve soldiers were activated for the first 
time since the Vietnam War,45 and in the post-9/11 era, especially with Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF), the RC started to be used extensively. The declaration of the GWOT and 
commencement of the pursuant operations in Iraq and Afghanistan created an 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 11–12. 
42 Price, “Effects of Activation,” 22. 
43 Herschelman, “United States Marine Corps Reserve,” 5. 
44 Joseph F. Schumacher, “Forecasting Retention in the United States Marine Corps Reserve” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 2, http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2005/
Mar/05Mar_Schumacher.pdf. 
45 Christopher D. Luther, “Post-9/11 Field Grade Officer Requirements in The Marine Corps Reserve” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 3, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5774/
11Mar_Luther.pdf?sequence=1. 
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unprecedented burden on the shoulders of the RC in the last decade. For example, from 
September 2001 to September 2009, a total of 62,343 Marine reservists were activated. 
This means 17% of the SelRes was activated annually during this time frame, on average. 
This rate is considerably higher than 0.26%, which was the activation rate of the pre-9/11 
period.46 The largest activation occurred in April 2003 when 17,807 Marine reservists, 
which is 45% of SelRes, were activated.47 The reason for this huge activation was the 
start of OIF. The activation of the SelRes Marines from September 2001 to September 
2009 is shown in Figure 3. These Marines are the activated Reserves serving active duty 
to support the ongoing operations like OIF at the stated timeframes.48 
 
Figure 3.  SelRes Activation Diagram between September 2001 and September 
200949 
                                                 
46 Lizarraga, “Patterns of MarineMarine Corps,” 84. 
47 Herschelman, “United States Marine Corps Reserve,” 5. 
48 Lizarraga, “Patterns of Marine Corps,” 3. 
49 Price, “Effects of Activation,” 7. 
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The increased employment of Reserve Units and individuals and other situations 
such as waste of resources or supporting the AC made the attrition problem an even 
greater issue than before. Especially in the last decade, events have affected the attrition 
and continuation decisions and behaviors of the Marine reservists. Figure 4, which is 
adapted from the research of Lizarraga, depicts attrition behavior of the enlisted 
personnel under 6x2-year contracts for the post-9/11 period. 
 
Figure 4.  NPS Continuation Behavior Graph50 
The first-term (first six years) attrition rate for the enlisted personnel who are 
contracted with 6x2-year contracts is 45–48% on average, as shown in Figure 4. 
Interestingly, the 12-month continuation rate for the Marines who reached their MDPSD 
is less than 20%. This situation results in 10% of Marine reservists remaining to serve in 
                                                 





the SMCR after seven years.51 This serious problem does not allow the Marine Corps to 
keep trained and experienced personnel to support the AC and wastes valuable resources 
such as money and time in training new enlisted personnel and officers. Furthermore, it is 
harder in such a situation to keep high-ranking officers and noncommissioned officers to 
fill the desired positions. The goal of this thesis is to analyze the attrition behavior of the 
enlisted personnel and officers and determine the characteristics of attrition. The findings 
of this study will provide information to the Marine Corps to reduce the attrition rate by 
increasing the number of reservists who fulfill their contracted periods. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
There are only a few studies that examine the attrition behavior of the reservists. 
Most of the research focuses on the AC attrition and continuation behaviors of the 
Marines. Though there is limited research for the RC, the majority of it is focused on 
attrition rate differences between the pre- and post-9/11 periods. Besides, some studies 
research the subpopulations within the Marine Corps RC, such as Incremental Initial 
Active Duty Training (IIADT).52 Furthermore, these studies tend not to focus on the 
question of “What factors impact the attrition rate?” and tend not to provide a general 
picture of the causes of the attrition. For officers, the studies are even more limited, 
especially for the RC, with most of the research studying mixed populations, which 
include officers and enlisted personnel together, such as Schumacher’s study.53 This fact 
renders it impossible to make conclusions about the attrition behavior and characteristics 
of the officers in the RC. This situation in literature creates a gap which this research 
intends to fill. 
By addressing the determinants of first-term attrition for enlisted and officer 
Selected Marine Corps Reservists, the negative consequences of the attrition problem can 
be reduced or even removed. First of all, the Marine Corps will keep its enlisted 
                                                 
51 Herschelman, “United States Marine Corps Reserve,” 7. 
52 Alan C. Dinsdale, “Modeling Incremental Initial Active Duty Continuation Probabilities in the 
Selected Marine Corps Reserve” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/41369/14Mar_Dinsdale_Alan.pdf?sequence=1. 
53 Schumacher, “Forecasting Retention.” 
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personnel and officers longer than before and will save money and time for training and 
orientating the new recruits. Second, by keeping more trained, more experienced, and 
more ready individuals, the RC will be better able to support the AC in its ongoing 
missions and operations. Third, the positions that remain unassigned due to a lack of 
senior officers and enlisted personnel because of attrition will be filled with qualified and 
suitable personnel. Fourth, because the Marine Corps will be better able to predict future 
end strength due to the low or desirable attrition, it will be able to employ manpower 
policies more accurately. The fifth result of this study will be to help the Marine Corps to 
set more accurate and attainable recruiting and accession goals based on more reliable 
data. This thesis’s findings will help the Marine Corps RC to better understand the 
continuation and attrition behavior of the reservists in the RC. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What factors are correlated with first-term attrition for Reserve Enlisted 
Marines? 
2. What factors are correlated with first-term attrition for Marine Reserve 
Officer? 
3. How do first-term attrition factors differ between officers and enlisted 
personnel? 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I is the introduction chapter of this study. It identifies the attrition 
problem and explains the structure and role of the Marine Corps RC. Chapter II is the 
literature review. It summarizes the findings of the previous studies about the attrition/
continuation behavior of the Marine Corps reservists and examines the important 
definitions used in this study. Chapter III reviews the data used to identify and explain the 
variables that will be used in the models and includes a brief discussion about the 
methodology. Chapter IV provides the descriptive statistics based on the data that will be 
used in the models and presents preliminary analysis. Chapter V introduces the models to 
predict the results, presents the validation of models, and discusses the results of the 
models. Chapter VI provides a summary, conclusions, and recommendations for further 
research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter II begins with an introduction, presents the literature review and 
concludes with a summary section. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Current literature about the attrition problem in the Marine Corps mostly focuses 
on the AC. But recently, there has been a trend to examine the attrition and retention 
behavior of Marines in the RC. Many researchers have tried to identify the effects of 
some important events, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks or OIF. Also, most of the 
remaining research examines the attrition problems of the subpopulations within the RC, 
such as IIADT. This research primarily focuses on enlisted personnel. There is no study 
which identifies the attrition behavior of the officers in the RC alone or with enlisted 
personnel. It is also worthwhile to mention that almost all of this research is conducted by 
the graduate students of the Naval Postgraduate School.54 
The goal of this thesis is to identify the determinants of first-term attrition for 
enlisted and officer Selected Marine Corps Reservists. This chapter introduces the studies 
that are relevant to the attrition problem in the SMCR and identifies the unexplored areas 
which this thesis reveals. The aim of this literature review is to provide a theoretical basis 
to create multivariate models to describe and predict the causes of attrition for the officers 
and enlisted personnel in the SMCR. 
At this point, it is important to distinguish and introduce some important 
definitions about the goal of this thesis. This study follows Lizarraga to describe these 
terms, starting with the term attrition. Attrition can be described as “the separation of 
service prior to the completion of agreed upon contracted terms of military service.”55 
However, defining attrition is a more complex issue due to the unique status of the RC. 
For example, there are various available contracts for enlisted personnel and officers in 
the SMCR. Although the MSO is fixed at eight years, the MDPSD may change from 
                                                 
54 Dinsdale, “Modeling Incremental Initial,” 7. 
55 Lizarraga, “Patterns of Marine Corps,” 21. 
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three years to six years. The remaining period of the contract is much less obliging than 
the first term and can be fulfilled in other units of the RC. Similar to this complexity, 
initial trainings such as Marine Combat Training (MCT) and Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS) School can be conducted at different times or incrementally, such as for 
those in the IIADT program. Also, the attrition for the RC cannot always be considered a 
loss for the Marine Corps. For example, a Marine reservist who is enrolled in an officer 
program is not be considered as a loss even though it is attrition for the SMCR. These 
differences and considerations must be kept in mind when analyzing and conducting 
attrition and retention studies in the SMCR and RC.56 
As opposed to attrition, retention is keeping the individuals in the service for 
another term. For example, if a Marine reservist completes his first term, and voluntarily 
chooses to remain in the SMCR for an additional period, this is called retention.57 When 
a reservist completes the first-term drilling obligation, this reservist is free to leave the 
SMCR as long as he remains in the Ready Reserve. While in the SMCR, it is mandatory 
to participate in the regular monthly and annual trainings. However, at the end of the first 
term, if the Marine reservists choose not to stay in the SMCR and are transferred to IRR, 
they do not have to attend the trainings other than mustering once a year.  
In the literature, retention and continuation are sometimes considered the same, 
but this is not the case. Although they are interrelated, contrary to retention studies which 
focus on whether the individual will remain at the end of the contracted period, 
continuation tries to predict whether those individuals who extended their contracts will 
remain in the service until the end of their new contracts.58 It can be seen from this 
definition that continuation encompasses longer time periods. For example, if an enlisted 
Marine remains after the first six-year contract, this situation is described as retention. If 
this individual completes his second six-year contract, this six-year period for the second 
contract is described as the continuation period.  
                                                 
56 Ibid., 21. 
57 Ibid., 22. 
58 Ibid., 32. 
 21
B. INDEPENDENT STUDIES 
This thesis focuses on the studies that examine the attrition behaviors of the 
Marine reservists in the SMCR. Because retention and continuation are related to 
attrition, studies on these topics will also be analyzed in the literature review. 
Attrition can be considered as two types: wasteful and acceptable.59 Acceptable 
attrition happens when a Marine reservist leaves his/her unit in the SMCR or leaves the 
RC but the Marine Corps keeps that individual in other units or organizations.60 For 
example, if a Marine Reserve Officer leaves the SMCR and joins the AC, or if an enlisted 
Marine Reservist leaves the Ready Reserve to enroll in an officer program, these losses 
are considered acceptable attrition. The following choices are also not considered losses: 
Inter-Unit Transfers (IUTs), the IMA program, and AR.61 Although these losses are 
attrition for the SMCR or the SelRes, they are kept in the Marine Corps anyway. On the 
contrary, wasteful attrition occurs when a Marine reservist is expelled from the Ready 
Reserve for disciplinary problems, such as unsatisfactory participation, or legal problems, 
such as being dismissed by the courts.62 Furthermore, leaving the SMCR or RC to join 
the other services in the military is considered wasteful attrition. Studies on this subject 
reveal that most attrition in the SMCR is caused by transfers to the IRR.63 Because this 
thesis examines the attrition only for the SMCR and because the attrition, whether 
acceptable or wasteful, means personnel loss for those units, all attrition in the SMCR 
will be considered wasteful attrition for this thesis. 
1. Modeling Incremental Initial Active Duty Continuation Probabilities 
in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve 
The most recent study about attrition in the SMCR is Dinsdale’s research.64 He 
examines the continuation behavior of the participants of the IIADT program in the 
                                                 
59 Dinsdale, “Modeling Incremental Initial,” 8. 
60 Herschelman, “United States Marine Corps Reserve,” 8. 
61 Lizarraga, “Patterns of Marine Corps,” 19. 
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63 Lizarraga, “Patterns of Marine Corps,” 19. 
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SMCR for the years 2002 to 2012. The IIADT program allows high school graduates 
who are enrolled in a college to enlist and complete their recruit training in the summer 
between high school and college.65 During the summer periods in college, enlistees 
attend trainings in their SMCR units. This program aims to attract qualified enlistees in 
the Marine Corps Reserve. In his research, Dinsdale analyzes the behaviors of Marines 
for 12, 24, 36, 48, 60, and 72 months of service completed by using logistic regression. 
Dinsdale finds that Marines who attend IIADT have a lower probability of continuation 
to 24, 36, and 48 months, while there is no statistically significant effect for continuation 
behavior for the remaining milestones. Furthermore, he finds that first class Physical 
Fitness Test (PFT) scores and AFQT scores have positive effects on the attrition 
probability. He also reveals that there is a decreasing trend of continuation rate for the 
Marines from FY02 to FY10. 
One of the differences between Dinsdale’s research and this research is that he 
examines mainly one subpopulation of the SMCR—affiliates of IIADT— and presents 
findings about it. However, this research considers the entire population and aims to 
provide findings for all of the Marines. Because of this, Dinsdale’s findings mainly relate 
to the behaviors of the Marines who attended the IIADT program and give little 
information about the general behaviors of the Marines in the SMCR. Another difference 
between Dinsdale’s research and our thesis is the aim. While Dinsdale researches the 
question of whether IIADT affiliates attrite more, our thesis investigates the reasons for 
attrition. Hence, Dinsdale does not place a heavy focus on the reasons for attrition. 
2. United States Marine Corps Reserve First-Term Attrition 
Characteristics 
In his thesis, Herschelman examines the attrition characteristics of the NPS 
enlisted Marines with a 6x2-year contract in SMCR between FY 1994 and FY 2005.66 A 
probit model is employed in this research to predict the results. He also studies the effects 
                                                 
65 United States Marine Corps, “Interim Policy and Procedures for the Marine Corps Reserve 
Incremental Initial Active Duty Training (IIADT) Program,” December 2014, http://www.marines.mil/
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of deployment and unit composition on attrition. His main question is whether the 9/11 
disaster affected the attrition behavior of the enlisted Marines in the SMCR. To answer 
this question he divides his data into three parts: the pre-9/11 cohort, the overlap 9/11 
cohort, and the post-9/11 cohort. He uses two models to reach the results. The first 
model, which is called the restricted model, includes only enlisted Marines who are 
deployed outside of the continental Unites States (OCONUS). Because the first group 
includes very few people deployed to OCONUS, he uses a second model, which is called 
an unrestricted model, that includes every Marine in the data. 
In his restricted model, Herschelman reveals that deploying to dangerous areas 
decreases the attrition probability. Also, in the unrestricted model, he finds that support of 
the GWOT is beneficial for retention. Other characteristics that increase the attrition 
probability include increase of age, being female, and being in the aviation MOS. 
Although the literature suggests that having at least one dependent increases attrition 
probability, Herschelman discovers the opposite in his research. Further, he finds that 
unemployment rate and higher Pro/Con scores decrease the attrition probability. 
However, other characteristics related to ability do not provide consistent and significant 
results. Similar to these inconsistent findings, regions also do not yield useful results 
excluding three exceptions. Out of the nine regions in the United States, which are 
consistent with the U.S. Census Bureau’s divisions, only three regions produce 
significant results. The Western Midwest, South Atlantic, and Southeastern regions have 
higher attrition rates than the control region, which is the Northeast. 
The first difference between our research and Herschelman’s is that he divides his 
data into three groups—pre-9/11, overlap 9/11, and post-9/11 cohorts—and he tries to 
reveal whether the catastrophic event of 9/11 has any effects on the attrition. Our study 
only analyzes the Marines who join the SMCR after 9/11, specifically between FY01 and 
FY14. Also, this study analyzes the determinants of attrition rather than the effects of any 
event. Another difference between the two studies is that Herschelman mainly considers 
the effect of deployment and restricted one of his models to include only Marines who 
were deployed to OCONUS. This research does not restrict its data to any subgroup and 
includes as many Marines as possible. Lastly, Herschelman analyzes only enlisted 
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Marines in the SMCR while this study analyzes enlisted Marines and officers separately, 
and will have the ability to compare them with each other. 
3. Patterns of Marine Corps Reserve Continuation Behavior Pre- and 
Post-9/11 
Lizarraga examines the continuation behaviors of NPS enlisted reservists after the 
end of their MDPSDs using a probit model.67 Specifically, he researches the effects of 
mobilization on continuation decisions of Marine Reservists beyond their MDPSDs. He 
argues that expectations of reservists have a great impact on their continuation rates and 
divides his data into three cohorts to assess the impact of expectations. Similar to 
Herschelman’s division, these cohorts are pre-9/11 cohort, the overlap 9/11 cohort, and 
the post-9/11 cohort. He states that the first cohort includes reservists who did not expect 
to be mobilized and were not mobilized, the second cohort includes Marines who did not 
expect to be mobilized but were mobilized, and the reservists in the last cohort include 
people who expected to be mobilized and were mobilized. 
Lizarraga finds that deployment affects the continuation probability. However, 
this effect diminishes in the overlap and post-9/11 cohorts. This fact gives credence to the 
idea that as the expectations are met and get clearer, the continuation probability 
decreases. He also discovers that length of the deployment is important. While the 1–6 
month mobilization has a positive effect, 7–12 months of mobilization decreases the 
continuation probability. Being female, being married, and serving in the Marine 
Logistics Group are other factors which decrease the continuation probability. On the 
other hand, being black, having the rank of Senior Noncommissioned Officer, and having 
higher Pro/Con and PFT marks increase the likelihood of continuation. Also, being 
divorced and having dependents increase the continuation probability. But these findings 
are not consistent in all the models used in the research. Lastly, the Mid-Atlantic and 
New England regions are found to have lower continuation rates, while the Mid-Atlantic, 
South Atlantic, and South East Central Region have higher continuation rates. But this 
finding is also not consistent in all the models used in the research. 
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In contrast to Lizarraga, we researched the first-term attrition of Marines in the 
SMCR rather than their continuation behavior after completing their first terms, which 
takes six years. Also, we do not divide our data into different cohorts and only use the 
data of Marines who were enlisted after the 9/11 period. Lastly, we use the data of both 
enlisted personnel and officers and get their results separately rather than using only one 
of them. 
4. Forecasting Retention in the United States Marine Corps Reserve 
In his thesis, Schumacher analyzes the effects of mobilization and unemployment 
rate on SMCR officers’ and enlisted personnel’s “stay in or leave” decision by utilizing 
logistic regression.68 The data he used encompasses the years 1988–1992 and 1996–
2004, which is provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS).  
Schumacher’s findings about mobilization show that being mobilized has a 
positive effect on the decision to stay in. However, if the length of the mobilization gets 
longer, the individual is less likely to stay in. These conclusions imply that multiple short 
mobilizations have a positive effect on retention. These findings are consistent with the 
logic of participating in the Reserve. If an individual is in the Marine Reserve, that means 
this person shows a desire to serve when required to do so. Furthermore, if this individual 
wanted to serve longer and on a full-time basis, this person would prefer the AC over the 
RC. 
Schumacher’s findings about unemployment rates show that lower unemployment 
rates at the end of the service in the home states of the reservists have a negative effect on 
retention. That is, if the Reservist believes that he can find a job in the civilian market, he 
is less likely to stay in. 
One possible drawback of this study is the time range of the data. As mentioned 
previously, it spans the years 1988–1992 and 1996–2004. That is, this study provides 
insight into the situation at the time of pre- and post-Gulf War. However, the usage 
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strategy of the RC has changed since 9/11 and the level of mobilization of Reserves has 
increased. That is why Schumacher’s study may fail to reflect the current situation. In 
contrast to the data of Schumacher, the data in this study will include post-9/11 era. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter summarized the studies found to be relevant to the topic of this 
thesis. This review will provide a theoretical basis to better comprehend the variables that 
will be used and the models that aim to identify the attrition behaviors of the Marine 
reservists.  
We use the probit regression model, since the dependent variable, which is 
attrition, is binary. However, these types of regressions are not only used in military or in 
attrition studies. There are many social science studies that use logistics regression, 
including economics, demographics, and sociology. For example, in their studies, 
Willging and Johnson analyze the factors that affect students’ decisions to leave online 
master’s degrees offered in the University of Illinois by utilizing logistic regression.69 
Their data includes the students who left the online program. They used age, gender, 
GPA, sub-groups of ethnicity, location of students, and sub-groups of occupation as 
dependent variables. According to the findings, females, international students, and 
students with higher GPAs are more likely to drop out; directors, managers, and 
coordinators are less likely to drop out; and age does not have any effect on students’ 
decision.  
 Like most of the studies on attrition and continuation, the data are divided into 
different cohorts based on the fiscal year to reveal any differences in the attrition rate of 
the Marines in different years, if they exist. We determine the causes of attrition and the 
effects of each of these causes to help the Marine Corps fight with the attrition problem 
and alleviate the negative effects of attrition, as described in detail in Chapter I. 
                                                 
69 Pedro A. Willging and Scott D. Johnson, “Factors that Influence Students’ Decision to Dropout of 
Online Courses,” Journal of Asynchronous Learning Networks 13, no. 3, accessed February 28, 2015, 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ862360.pdf. 
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III. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
This chapter represents information about the source and content of data that is 
used in the multivariate models to predict the determinants of first-term attrition for 
enlisted and officer selected Marine Corps reservists. It also describes the methodology to 
clean and code the data. Furthermore, this chapter explains the descriptions of variables 
and the effects of each variable on attrition in previous studies. Finally, the limitations of 
the data are discussed in the end of this chapter. 
A. DATA SOURCE 
The data about individual enlisted personnel and officers are provided by 
Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, covering the years 2001 
through 2014. Any personal identification information was eliminated before acquisition, 
and unique numbers are assigned to each individual to prevent confusion and enable 
longitudinal analysis. The data about home state unemployment rates were received from 
the BLS and also cover the years 2001 through 2014. 
B. DATA DESCRIPTION 
There are two separate individual level data sets: the first one contains the 
information about enlisted personnel, and the second one contains the information about 
officer Reservists. The original enlisted personnel data set consists of 121,942 
individuals, and the officer data set includes 10,254 individuals. Each of the original data 
sets is panel data, which means that the two data sets consist of individuals who are 
observed during certain periods between 2001 and 2014. In that respect, each observation 
in our data sets gives a reservist’s service record for a specific year. If a Marine reservist 
leaves, the record ends at that attrition year. 
Because there is no variation within the individuals in the data, the panel data is 
converted into cross-sectional data, which means that there is only one record line for 
each individual. For this conversion, first-year information is used for sex, race, 
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education, AFQT score, and waiver variables, and last-year information is used for all 
other variables such as age, marital status, and rank variables. 
Since this study is about first-term attrition, which lasts six years for enlisted 
personnel, and because the last year in our data sets is 2014, we dropped the observations 
whose Pay Entry Base Date (PEBD) is after 2008 for enlisted personnel. This operation 
resulted in dropping 76,956 individuals in the enlisted data set. However, the same 
approach was not followed for the officer data for reasons which are described in Chapter 
V. A summary of these operations made in the data sets is shown in Table 3. 
Unemployment rate data is merged with officer and enlisted data sets. For this 
merge, the unemployment rate of the home state of the individuals at the time of attrition, 
if attritted, or MDPSD, if not attritted, is used. Thus, unemployment rate is added to 
officer/enlisted data sets as one column and, naturally, this operation did not make any 
change in the number of observations in the data sets. 
Table 3.   Summary of Operations Made in Data Sets 
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C. VARIABLE OVERVIEW 
The variables represented in this part are cleaned and coded data which will be 
used in the multivariate models. An overview of each variable is shown in Table 4. The 
dependent variable is attrition. Independent variables are divided into five groups: 
demographics, ability and aptitude, military characteristics, geographic characteristics, 
and fiscal year cohort. Demographics consist of six sub-groups: gender, race, education, 
marital status, dependents, and age. Ability and aptitude consist of four sub-groups: 
AFQT Score, Pro/Con Marks, PFT scores, and waivers. Military characteristics consist of 
two sub-groups: pay grade and MOS category. Geographic characteristics consist of two 
sub-groups: hometown and unemployment rate. Fiscal year cohorts consist of the years 
between 2001 and 2010. 
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Table 4.   Overview of Variables 
Category Variable Description Variable Name 
Variable 
Type Range 
DEPENDENT     
 Attritted in the first-term attrition Binary 
1 = Attritted 
0 = Otherwise 
INDEPENDENT     
Demographics Gender female Binary 1 = Female 0 = Otherwise 
 Race white Binary 1 = White 0 = Otherwise 
  non-white Binary 1 = Other Race 0 = Otherwise 
 Marital Status married Binary 1 = Married 0 = Otherwise 
  divorced Binary 1 = Divorced 0 = Otherwise 
  single Binary 1 = Single 0 = Otherwise 
 Dependents depend 
Binary 1 = At least 1 
Dependent 
0 = Otherwise 
 Age age Continuous Min = 17/20 Max = 52/62 
 Education HS_grad Binary 
1 = HS 
Graduate 
0 = Otherwise 
  more_HS Binary 
1 = Higher than 
HS Diploma 
0 = Otherwise 
Ability and 
Aptitude AFQT Scores afqt Continuous 
Min = 11/99 
Max = 52/99 
 PFT Scores pft_1st Binary 
1 = 1st Class 
Score 
0 = Otherwise 
  pft_2nd Binary 
1 = 2nd Class 
Score 
0 = Otherwise 
  pft_3rd Binary 
1 = 3rd Class 
Score 
0 = Otherwise 




  cons Continuous Average Conduct Marks 
 waivers waiver Binary 1 =  If Waiver Exists  
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Category Variable Description Variable Name 
Variable 
Type Range 
0 = Otherwise 
Military 
Characteristics Rank E2 Binary 
1 = PFC and P  
0 = Otherwise 
  E3 Binary 1 = LCpL 0 = Otherwise 
  E4 Binary 1 = Cpl. 0 = Otherwise 
  E5 Binary 1 = Sgt. 0 = Otherwise 
  E6 Binary 
1 = SSgt and 
Higher 
0 = Otherwise 
  W2 Binary 1 = CWO2 0 = Otherwise 
  W3 Binary 1 = CWO3 0 = Otherwise 
  W4 Binary 1 = CWO4 0 = Otherwise 
  W5 Binary 1 = CWO5 0 = Otherwise 
  O1 Binary 1 = 2
nd Lt. 
0 = Otherwise 
  O2 Binary 1 = 1
st Lt. 
0 = Otherwise 
  O3 Binary 1 = Capt. 0 = Otherwise 
  O4 Binary 1 = Maj. 0 = Otherwise 
  O5 Binary 1 = Lt.Col. 0 = Otherwise 
  O6 Binary 1 = Col. 0 = Otherwise 
 Occupational Specialty combat_mos Binary 
1 = If Combat 
0 = Otherwise 
  aviation_mos Binary 1 = If Aviation 0 = Otherwise 
  support_mos Binary 1 = If Support 0 = Otherwise 
Geographic 
Characteristics Hometown    
 
Midwest East 
IL, IN, MI, WI, 
OH 
home_midwesteast Binary 
1 = If Related 
State 
0 = Otherwise 
 
Midwest West 




1 = If Related 
State 
0 = Otherwise 
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CT, MA, ME, 
NH, RI, VT 
home_newengland Binary 
1 = If Related 
State 
0 = Otherwise 
 Mid Atlantic NJ, NY, PA home_midatlantic Binary 
1 = If Related 
State 
0 = Otherwise 
 
South Atlantic 
FL, GA, SC, 
NC, VA, 
WV, DC, MD, 
DE 
home_southatlantic Binary 
1 = If Related 
State 
0 = Otherwise 
 
South East 
KY, TN, MS, 
AL 
home_southeast Binary 
1 = If Related 
State 








1 = If Related 
State 
0 = Otherwise 
 
West Mountain 
AZ, NM, NV, 
UT, ID, 
CO, MT, WY 
home_westmountai
n Binary 
1 = If Related 
State 
0 = Otherwise 
 
West Pacific 
CA, HI, OR, 
WA, AK 
home_westpacific Binary 
1 = If Related 
State 
0 = Otherwise 





Cohorts  FY02 Binary 
1 = If PEBD in 
Related year 
0 = Otherwise 
  FY03 Binary 
1 = If PEBD in 
Related year 
0 = Otherwise 
  FY04 Binary 
1 = If PEBD in 
Related year 
0 = Otherwise 
  FY05 Binary 
1 = If PEBD in 
Related year 
0 = Otherwise 
  FY06 Binary 
1 = If PEBD in 
Related year 
0 = Otherwise 
  FY07 Binary 
1 = If PEBD in 
Related year 
0 = Otherwise 
  FY08 Binary 1 = If PEBD in 
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0 = Otherwise 
  FY09 Binary 
1 = If PEBD in 
Related year 
0 = Otherwise 
  FY10 Binary 
1 = If PEBD in 
Related year 
0 = Otherwise 
 
D. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Attrition is an important problem for the Marine Corps Reserve and is affected by 
many factors which will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. As described in 
the previous section, attrition may either be acceptable, such as a transfer to AC, or 
wasteful, such as being expelled from the military for disciplinary reasons. But for the 
SMCR, both types of attrition represent losses for the units and are therefore considered 
wasteful attrition for the SMCR. To identify and determine the causes of attrition, the 
binary variable attrition is created in the multivariate models for this study. This variable 
takes the value of “1” if the Marine reservist has less than six observations for enlisted 
personnel and “0” otherwise. For the officers, the number of observations is four to 
decide whether the individual has left or not. The rationale behind this decision is the 
duration of the first-term contracts, which is six-year for the enlisted personnel and four-
year for the officers. According to this description, the attrition rate for the officers and 
enlisted personnel are 57% and 44%, consecutively, in our data. However, these rates 
include measurement error. For example, if a Marine leaves the RC in 2002 after serving 
only one year and returns back again in 2005 and serves another five years, that 
individual should be considered as attritted. However, because total years served in the 
RC is six years, our model will not consider this individual as attritted. Also, because of 
the data constraint, it is not possible to define whether a Marine is a wasteful attrition or 
acceptable attrition. These shortcomings should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results. 
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E. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
This section presents the independent variables that are used in the multivariate 
models in this study. 
1. Demographic Variables 
When researching manpower-related topics, it is very important to control for and 
evaluate the effects of demographic characteristics because these factors have 
considerably high effects on the attrition decisions of personnel in the military. The 
factors that will be included under demographic characteristics are gender, race, marital 
status, dependents, age, and education level. 
a. Gender 
Gender category is included in this study to identify the effect of being male or 
female on the continuation decisions of the Marine Reservist. Findings in the literature 
suggest that females are more likely to attrite than males. For example, Lizarraga 
concludes that females are 4.7 percentage points less likely to continue.70 Recent policies 
of the Marine Corps signify that females will assume more active roles in the Marine 
Corps and they will be assigned to combat unit positions.71 These facts make it more 
important to evaluate the effect of gender on the attrition probability. There is one binary 
variable in the multivariate models in this study to capture this effect: female. It takes the 
value of “1” if the individual has the relative gender and “0” otherwise. Figure 5 depicts 
the gender composition of the officers and enlisted personnel in the data separately. 
                                                 
70 Lizarraga, “Patterns of Marine Corps,” 120. 
71 Dinsdale, “Modeling Incremental Initial,” 19. 
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Figure 5.  Composition of Gender for Officers and Enlisted Personnel 
b. Race 
This category is included in this study to capture the effect of racial characteristics 
on the attrition behavior of the Marine Reservists. Previous studies in the literature find 
that blacks are more likely to continue while Asians are more likely to attrit.72 Two 
binary variables are identified for racial classification: white and non-white. These 
variables take the value of “1” if the individual is in the related category and “0” 
otherwise. There are numerous missing values in the data for race category. Furthermore, 
many Marine Reservists have response of “chose not to answer” for this category, so 
these observations were considered as missing value for the data. These facts affect the 
predictive ability of the multivariate models in this study. Figure 6 presents the 
distribution of the officers and enlisted personnel separately in the data by their race 
category. 
                                                 

















Figure 6.  Composition of Race for Officers and Enlisted Personnel 
c. Marital Status 
Marital status variables are added to the multivariate models to capture the effect 
of being married, single, or divorced on the continuation decisions of the Marine 
reservists. Because problems and mental and emotional adversities of divorced 
individuals may be different than those who are married or single, another variable for 
divorced Marines is added to identify the different effects of this status on the attrition 
probability. Hence, there are three binary variables under this category: single, married, 
and divorced. But because the number of divorced individuals in the officer data set is too 
low, only the married and single variables are defined for the officers and the married 
variable is included in the model. These variables take the value of “1” if the individual is 
in the related category and “0” otherwise. Literature suggests that while the effect of 
being married is negative on attrition, being divorced has positive effects. For example, 
Lizarraga finds that individuals who are married are more likely to attrit but concludes 
that divorced individuals are 9.4 percentage points more likely to continue.73 Figure 7 
shows the marital status composition of the officers and enlisted personnel in the data. 
                                                 























Figure 7.  Composition of Marital Status for Officers and Enlisted Personnel 
d. Dependents 
According to the literature, dependents have a positive effect on the attrition 
probability. For example, Lizarraga74 and Herschelman75 conclude that having one or 
more dependents increases the continuation probability. This category does not include 
only children; it also includes other people such as spouses or elder relatives who need 
continuous care. To control for and assess the effects of dependents on the attrition 
probability, the variable dependent is defined in this study. This variable takes the value 
of “1” if the individual has any dependents and “0” otherwise. Figure 8 depicts the 
dependent information of the officers and enlisted personnel in the data. 
                                                 
74 Ibid., 122. 


























Figure 8.  Composition of Dependents Status for Officers and Enlisted 
Personnel 
e. Age 
The variable age is included in the multivariate models to examine the effect of 
age on the continuation decisions of the individual Marines. Literature suggests that age 
has negative effects on the attrition probability, because as people mature, they have 
more chances to pursue better career options in the civilian sector.76 Age is a continuous 
variable and takes the value of age of the individual Marine Reservists on their attrition 
date or MDPSD. Figure 9 provides maximum, minimum, and mean values of age 
variable for officers and enlisted personnel in the data separately. 
 
Figure 9.  Maximum, Minimum, and Mean Values of Age for Officers and 
Enlisted Personnel 
                                                 






































f. Education Level 
This variable is included in the models to assess the effects of education level of 
each Marine Reservist on the attrition probability. The education levels at the pay entry 
base date (PEBD) for each officer and enlisted personnel are taken into consideration in 
this category. Two sub-categories are identified to group the individuals in the data sets: 
high school and below high school graduate is the first category, and more than high 
school graduate is the second category. These categories are denoted with binary 
variables which are HS_grad and more_HS. They take the value of “1” if the individual is 
in the related education category and “0” otherwise. Figure 10 depicts the distribution of 
the officers and enlisted personnel by their education level separately. 
 
Figure 10.  Composition of Education Level for Officers and Enlisted Personnel 
2. Ability and Aptitude 
Under this category, there are some variables which this study uses in the 
multivariate models to evaluate the ability, motivation, adaptability, and performance of 
each individual Marine. These variables are AFQT scores, PFT, Pro/Con Marks, and 
waivers. 
a. AFQT Scores 
AFQT is a standardized test which every officer and enlisted personnel has to take 


























individual and is a significant proxy to assess those traits. The range of AFQT scores is 
between 0 and 99. It is possible that an individual who has a high score on the AFQT 
may be willing to stay in the military. However, it is also likely that this individual has 
abilities and knowledge which may be high in demand in the civilian economy and may 
want to leave the military to make use of his abilities. Literature suggests that higher 
AFQT scores increase the attrition probability. For example, Dinsdale finds in one of his 
models that high AFQT scores decrease the continuation probability.77 To assess the 
effects of AFQT scores on the attrition behavior of the Marines in the SMCR, this 
research includes the AFQT as a proxy for ability and attitude. The AFQT scores are 
included in the models using the continuous variable afqt. AFQT scores are categorized 
in DOD Directive 1145.178 and this categorization can be seen in Table 5. An enlistee has 
to be in the Category IV or above to be accepted to the U.S. military. Maximum, 
minimum, and mean values of AFQT scores for the enlisted personnel and officers in the 
SMCR are depicted in Figure 11. 
Table 5.   Classification of the AFQT Scores79 
Category Definition Percentile Scores 
I Above Average 93-99 
II Above Average 65-92 
IIIA Average 50-64 
IIIB Average 31-49 





                                                 
77 Dinsdale, “Modeling Incremental Initial,” 42. 
78 Department of Defense, Quality Distribution of Military Manpower, Department of Defense 
Directive 1145.1, Washington, DC: DOD, last modified November 21, 2003, 2, http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/
blaw/dodd/corres/pdf2/d11451p.pdf. 
79 Ibid., 2. 
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Figure 11.  Maximum, Minimum, and Mean Values of AFQT Scores for 
Enlisted Personnel and Officers 
b. Physical Fitness Test (PFT) 
PFT is another proxy which can be used to assess the effect of ability on 
continuation decisions of the Marines. The PFT is a semi-annual test that evaluates the 
physical conditions of individual Marines. The PFT consists of three sub-categories: 3-
mile run, crunches, and pull-ups. Each of these sub-categories has a maximum score of 
100; the aggregate PFT score is calculated by summing these sub-category scores. Hence, 
the maximum score for the PFT is 300. This study uses the classification of the PFT 
scores, which is described in Marine Corps Order P6100.12, to categorize the PFT scores 















Table 6.   Classification of the PFT Scores80 
Class Age 17–26 Age 27–39 Age 40–45 Age 46+ 
1st Class 225–300 200–300 175–300 150–300 
2nd Class 175–224 150–199 125–174 100–149 
3rd Class 135–174 110–149 88–124 65–99 
 
The scores below the 3rd Class scores are considered to be “failures.” Findings in 
the literature suggest that higher PFT scores are associated with the lower attrition 
probability. For example, Dinsdale finds that higher PFT scores decrease the attrition 
probability.81 Lizarraga also concludes that Marines who have the score of 2nd class and 
below are less likely to continue.82 There are three binary variables in the multivariate 
models to assess the effect of PFT scores on the attrition. These are pft_1st, pft_2nd and 
pft_3rd. These variables take the value of “1” if the Marine reservist is in the related 
category and “0” otherwise. Figure 12 shows the distribution of officers and enlisted 
personnel by their PFT score category separately. 
 
Figure 12.  Composition of PFT Scores for Officers and Enlisted Personnel 
                                                 
80 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Physical Fitness Test and Body Composition Program 
Manual (Short Title: MCPFTBCP), Marine Corps Order P6100.12, Washington, DC: Department of the 
Navy, May 2002, 2–9, http://navy.rotc.umich.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/
Marine_Corps_PFT_Standards.pdf. 
81 Dinsdale, “Modeling Incremental Initial,” 59. 




























c. Proficiency and Conduct (Pro/Con) Marks 
Proficiency and Conduct Marks are given to enlisted Marines who hold the rank 
of corporal (E-4) and below on a semi-annual basis. These marks are important 
assessments of the military ability that the Marines possess. Proficiency marks assess 
how a Marine performed on his primary duty and evaluates attributes such as mission 
accomplishment, individual character, intellect and wisdom, and physical fitness.83 The 
conduct mark is “a fair objective evaluation of the Marine’s conduct for the marking 
period”84 and takes into consideration qualities such as general bearing, courtesy, moral 
fitness, influence on others, and participation in activities that are not related to unit 
mission.85 So these marks contain valuable information to assess the ability and aptitude 
of the individuals. Pro/Con marks have a range of 0 to 5.0; 0 to 3.9 is considered “below 
average,” and 4.0 to 4.4 is considered “average.” Likewise, 4.5 to 4.8 and 4.9 to 5.0 are 
“excellent” and “outstanding,” respectively. These marks are included as averaged marks 
in the data, and there were 17,210 and 17,208 observations for proficiency and conduct 
marks, consecutively, which have the value of “0.” These values are considered missing 
values because “0” is not considered to be an appropriate value for Pro/Con marks. To 
assess the effects of Pro/Con marks, the continuous pros and cons variables are identified 
and included in the enlisted model only. These variables take the value of average Pro/
Con marks that an individual is assigned. Also, these marks are multiplied by 10 to make 
the interpretation easier for the readers. Literature suggests that increased Pro/Con marks 
lower the attrition probability.86  However, it should be noted that these marks are 
assigned by human assessment and therefore include bias. Figure 13 provides the average 
Pro/Con marks for the enlisted personnel in the data. 
                                                 
83 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Individual Records Administration Manual (Short Title: 
IRAM), Marine Corps Order P1070.12, Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, July 2000, 4–42, 
http://www.quantico.marines.mil/Portals/147/IRAM.pdf. 
84 Ibid., 4–39. 
85 Ibid., 4–39. 
86 Herschelman, “United States Marine Corps Reserve,” 63. 
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Figure 13.  Maximum, Minimum, and Mean Values of Pro/Con Marks for 
Enlisted Personnel 
d. Waivers 
Waivers are used to enable the accession of officers and enlisted personnel in the 
military who normally would be disqualified because of some reasons like involving in 
non-serious offenses or having unfavorable specialties. There are numerous types of 
waivers such as conduct, medical, dependent, age, tattoo, or drug. There are also 
subcategories for each of them. For example conduct waivers consist of serious non-
traffic, minor non-traffic, felonies, serious traffic, minor traffic, and substance-abuse 
offenses. Explaining all types of the waivers is beyond the scope of this study. If a 
potential enlistee is otherwise ineligible due to one the reasons explained here, that 
individual may seek a waiver and, if accepted, would be allowed to enter the Marine 
Corps. As the military increases the number of recruits each year, the number of people 
who have waivers, and also the rate of these individuals in the military, increase.87 This 
fact makes the issue of waiver important consideration for the researches who examine 
the attrition problem in the military. Distifeno finds that having a conduct waiver 
                                                 
87 Christopher Distifeno, “Effects of Moral Conduct Waivers on First-Term Attrition of U.S. Army 














increases the attrition probability in the Army.88 To assess the effect of waivers and the 
magnitude of the problem, this study identified the binary variable waiver which takes the 
value of “1” if the individual has any kind of waiver and “0” otherwise. Because the data 
set for officers does not include the waiver information, this variable is only included in 
the model for the enlisted personnel. Rather than categorizing the waiver types and 
examining the effects of each of them, waivers are lumped into one single variable. 
Because, the people who have any kind of waivers in the data is only 18%. Figure 14 
presents the waiver composition of enlisted Marines in the data set. 
 
Figure 14.  Composition of Waiver Status for Enlisted Personnel 
3. Military Characteristics 
This category includes the variables which are related to military environment, 
specifically, rank and unit type. 
a. Rank 
Rank is an important indicator which provides valuable information about the 
military characteristics, ability, and performance of the individual Marines. It is possible 
that individuals who are more devoted to the Marine Corps and who enjoy the military 
lifestyle will stay in the Marine Corps longer and will achieve higher rank. Hence, this 
                                                 









information is important when examining the attrition behavior of Marines. The original 
data includes the ranks of the individual officers and enlisted Marines, but these ranks get 
higher as the sequence number increases because the individuals continue to be promoted 
during their first term as well. Hence, this study takes into consideration the ranks of 
individuals when they are attritted or reached their MDPSD. There are eleven binary 
variables in this study for the warrant officers and officers which are labeled as W1, W2, 
W3, W4, W5, O1, O2, O3, O4, O5, and O6. For the enlisted personnel, there are five 
binary variables which are E2, E3, E4, E5, and E6. These variables take the value of “1” 
if the Marine has the relevant rank and “0” otherwise. Figures 15 and 16 depict the 
distribution of the officer and enlisted Marines by their ranks separately. 
 
 





























Figure 16.  Composition of Rank for Officers 
b. Occupational Specialty 
Each Marine in the Marine Corps is assigned one of the three MOS which shape 
their specific job characteristics and their working environment. These categories are 
Combat Arms, Aviation, and Support. The culture, work climate, and interpersonal 
relationships may differ from unit to unit and these factors may affect the Marines 
differently. Also, it is possible that some specialized skills, such as those in air wing 
units, may be highly demanded in the civilian sector and experience higher attrition 
rates.89 Besides, it is very important that the demands, abilities, and knowledge of the 
workers should be consistent with the conditions and the requirements of the working 
environment. This fact is called person–job fit and it has a considerable effect on the 
continuation behavior of individual Marines. Considering these facts, research that 
examines the attrition or continuation rates in the military should include these variables 
in their models. Prior studies suggest that MOS has significant effects on attrition rates, 
                                                 


































although the results are mixed and inconsistent. For example, Lizarraga concludes that 
while Marines who are affiliated with the aviation MOS are more likely to continue, 
individuals in the support MOS have more attrition rates.90 On the contrary, Herschelman 
finds that Marine reservists who are with aviation MOS are more likely to attrit.91 To 
control for and to capture the effect of the MOS on attrition probability, this study 
includes the following MOS variables which are: combat arms, which includes infantry, 
armor, and artillery; aviation, which includes aviation-related branches such as aircraft 
maintenance and air traffic control; and support, which includes the rest of the branches. 
These variables are binary and labeled as combat_mos, aviation_mos and support_mos 
consecutively. They take the value of “1” if the individual is in the related category and 
“0” otherwise. Because there are no aviators in the enlisted personnel according to the 
data set, only the combat arms and support categories are included in the model for 
enlisted personnel. Figure 17 depicts the distribution of officers and enlisted personnel by 
their MOS separately. 
 
Figure 17.  Composition of MOS for Officers and Enlisted Personnel 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 122. 



















4. Geographic Characteristics 
This category includes the variables which are related to geographic 
characteristics, specifically, hometown and unemployment rate. 
a. Hometown 
Different regions have different characteristics such as economic conditions, 
demographic conditions, and support for military. These factors affect the attrition 
probability of the Marines in the SMCR. In accordance with the Census Bureau of the 
United States’ division of the country into nine regions, this study assigns each Marine 
Reservist to a region of the United States based on each reservist’s hometown state. 
These regions are Midwest East, Midwest West, New England, Mid-Atlantic, South 
Atlantic, Southeast Central, Southwest Central, West Mountain, and West Pacific. Figure 
18 depicts these regions and the states they include. Previous research in the literature 
finds mixed and insignificant results about the geographic region of the Marines. For 
example, while Lizarraga concludes that Southeast, Mid-Atlantic, West Mountain, and 
New England regions have more attrition rates in one of his models, findings in his other 
models are insignificant.92 Similarly, Herschelman also finds inconsistent results in his 
models. Hometown is a binary variable and takes the value of “1” if the individual is in 
the related region and “0” otherwise. This variable is labeled as home_MidwestEast, 
home_NewEngland, and so forth. Figures 19 and 20 show the distribution of the officers 
and enlisted Marine reservist by their hometown separately. 
                                                 
92 Lizarraga, “Patterns of Marine Corps,” 123. 
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Figure 18.  Census Regions and Divisions of the United States93 
                                                 
93 United States Census Bureau, Geographic Areas Reference Manual, Washington, DC: Department 




Figure 19.  Composition of Home of Record Region for Enlisted Personnel 
 























































b. Unemployment Rate 
The unemployment rate can have a significant effect on the continuation decision 
of individual Marines. Price suggests that when the unemployment rate increases, 
continuation rate increases as response.94 Hence, to assess the effect of unemployment 
rate on the attrition probability for the SMCR, the variable unemp is included in the 
models. This is a continuous variable which takes the value of unemployment rate of the 
hometown state of the each individual when the Marine reservist is attritted or reaches the 
MDPSD. 
5. Fiscal Year Cohorts 
Unique and significant events such as 9/11 or an economic crisis in each year may 
affect the continuation behavior of the Marines in the SMCR. For this reason, fiscal year 
cohorts are created and individuals are included in these cohorts based on their respective 
PEBD. The fiscal year cohort is a binary variable and takes the value of “1” if the 
individual is in the related category and “0” otherwise. This variable will enable us to 
detect any differences if present between the years 2001 and 2010. Dinsdale finds that 
attrition rate increases with the time.95 This variable is labeled as FY followed by two 
digit numbers representing the year (FY01, FY02, etc.). Figures 21 and 22 depict the 
distribution of the officers and enlisted personnel by their Fiscal Year cohorts separately. 
                                                 
94 Price, “Effects of Activation,” 109. 
95 Dinsdale, “Modeling Incremental Initial,” 59. 
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Figure 21.  Cohort Distribution for Enlisted Personnel 
 


















































F. DATA LIMITATIONS 
The goal of this thesis is to determine the causes of first-term attrition for the 
officers and enlisted personnel in the SMCR. Although the models which are employed 
in this thesis provide valid and sound findings to estimate the causes of the attrition and 
their magnitude, there are some limitations to keep in mind which affect the predictive 
ability of the models. 
There are many missing values and inconsistencies in both of the data sets. For 
example, PFT scores category includes 8,400 missing values for enlisted personnel and 
1,011 missing values for officers. These numbers account for the 17% of the officers and 
20% of the enlisted personnel in the data sets. Further, the dates, such as the expiration of 
the current contract and PEBD, include illogical records such as October 2097. Also, 
some variables include categories like “declined to answer” or “choose not to answer.” 
These categories are merged with either other sub-category within the variable or 
considered as missing value. For example, 272 observations for officers and 4,886 
observations for enlisted personnel, which account for the 5% and 12% of the total 
observations consecutively, were converted to missing value. Because of these restraints 
in the data sets, the predictive ability of the models for attrition is negatively affected. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the data that was used in the research; the data was cleaned 
and coded prior to use in the model. Also, the dependent and independent variables are 
introduced and explained in detail. Lastly, the limitations of the data and results of these 
limitations are provided. 
The dependent variable in this thesis is attrition, which takes the value of “1” if 
the individual fails to complete his initial service contract and “0” otherwise. The 
independent variables consisted of the following: 
 Demographics (Gender, Race, Education, Marital Status, Number of 
Dependents, and Age) 
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 Ability and Aptitude (AFQT Scores, Pro/Con Marks, PFT Scores, and 
Waivers) 
 Military Characteristics (Rank and MOS Category) 
 Geographic Characteristics (Hometown and Unemployment Rate) 
 Fiscal Year Cohorts (between 2001 and 2013) 
The variables used in the models help to better predict the causes of enlisted 
attrition and officer attrition in the SMCR. The findings about the determinants of 
attrition will help the personnel decision-makers in the Marine Corps to better understand 
the attrition behaviors of the Marines in the SMCR and employ suitable and accurate 
policies to solve the problems related to attrition.  
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IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This chapter presents descriptive statistics and compares the results of the data 
from 2001 to 2014. 
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Summary statistics of the enlisted personnel and officer data sets are shown in 
Appendix A. Each variable is presented in one of three categories for each data set: (1) 
full sample, (2) attritted, and (3) not attritted. There are two lines for each variable: the 
first line presents the mean values, and the second line presents the standard deviation in 
parenthesis. The comparisons and assessments in this chapter are made considering this 
table. 
The data sets contain observations between 2001 and 2008 for enlisted personnel, 
and between 2001 and 2014 for officers. 
B. COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS 
In accordance with the variable categorization introduced previously in Chapter 
III, this section presents comparisons of the results and assessments about variables 
which are closely related in attrition. 
1. Demographics (Gender, Race, Marital Status, Dependents, Age, 
Education Level) 
Demographic factors can be significant determinants in the decision to stay in or 
leave the RC and are always examined in attrition studies. The characteristics of human 
populations provide insight into whether there is a relationship between attrition 
probability and a certain segment of the population. The attrition percentages of 
demographics for officers and enlisted personnel are shown in Figures 23 and 24. 
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Figure 23.  Demographics Percentages of Enlisted Personnel 
 
































Descriptive statistics of both data sets allow us to make superficial examinations 
to reach preliminary findings about attrition. According to the results, gender does not 
seem to have a significant effect on attrition. For example, for enlisted personnel, 
although the percentage of females is high for the attritted population, the difference is 
little, only 1 percentage point. For officers, the percentage of females in the attritted and 
non-attritted population is the same, 4%.  
Similarly, race variables also yield the same results as the gender. While whites 
consist of 87% of the entire population of enlisted personnel, they make up 91% of the 
officers. Though the white Marines in the attritted portion of the populations are less than 
the Marines in the attritted portion, the difference is 2 and 1 percentage points for the 
enlisted personnel and for officers, consecutively. 
Variables for marital status, especially being single and married, have significant 
effects on the attrition based on the descriptive statistics results. The difference is more 
obvious for officers. While the percentage of single reservists in the attritted group is 5 
percentage points more than the percentage of singles in the non-attritted group for 
enlisted personnel, the difference is 44 percentage points for officers. Similarly, the 
difference for married reservists is 5 and 41 percentage points for enlisted personnel and 
for officers, consecutively. Based on these results, it can be concluded that being married 
decreases the attrition probability for the Marine reservists, especially for the officers. 
However, divorced Marines are distributed evenly between the groups, which provides 
no evidence about the attrition behavior of enlisted personnel. But officers who are 
divorced are associated with lower attrition probabilities since the percentage of officers 
in the non-attritted group is greater than the percentage of divorced officers in the attritted 
group by 3 percentage points. 
Another factor which reduces the attrition probability according to the descriptive 
statistics is the dependent status. Having one or more dependents decreases the attrition 
probability of the Marines since the individuals in the non-attritted groups who have 
dependents are greater than the Marines in the attritted group. Specifically, the difference 
is 7 and 21 percentage points for enlisted personnel and officers, successively. Likewise, 
age decreases the attrition probability for both populations. The approximate age is 25 
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years for enlisted personnel and 37 years for officers. The non-attritted group is 
approximately two years and eight years older than the attritted group for enlisted 
personnel and officers, consecutively. Hence, especially for the officers, age is positively 
associated with the attrition behavior of the Marines. 
One of the striking findings in the education category is the difference in the 
education levels of the Marines. While 95% of the officers have an education above the 
high school level, this rate is only 6% for the enlisted Marines in the SMCR. Although 
this is the case, education levels do not seem to have a major role in the attrition 
behaviors of the Marines. The enlisted Marines are distributed evenly among the 
education categories. Similarly, the difference between the attritted and non-attritted 
group for the officers is only 4 percentage points.  
2. Ability and Aptitude (AFQT Score, PFT Scores, Pro/Con Marks, 
Waivers) 
Ability and aptitude are also important factors to identify the causes of attrition. 
As mentioned previously, ability and aptitude indicators, such as AFQT score, Pro/Con 
marks, and PFT scores, are closely related to military performance and provide 
significant information about a reservist’s motivation, adaptability, and person–job fit. 
Therefore, they are good identifiers for whether a reservist will decide to stay in or leave 
the SMCR. The attrition percentages of ability and aptitude variables for officers and 
enlisted personnel are shown in Figures 25 and 26. 
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Figure 25.  Ability and Aptitude Indicators Percentages of Enlisted Personnel 
 






























AFQT scores differ slightly between the attritted and non-attritted groups of both 
populations but suggest contrary conclusions for each of them. For example, the average 
AFQT score of the non-attritted group of enlisted personnel is higher than the average 
AFQT score of the attritted group. Specifically, the score of non-attritted group is 4.5 
points more than the score of attritted group. However, the average AFQT score of 
attritted group of officers is 2 points higher than the score of the non-attritted group. 
These results suggest that higher AFQT scores are associated with lower attrition 
probabilities for enlisted personnel but higher attrition probabilities for officers. 
The situation is different for PFT scores. The distributions of enlisted personnel 
and officers between the attritted and non-attritted groups are almost perfect. For 
example, there is no difference for the enlisted personnel, and the difference for the 
officers is only 1 percentage point for the 1st class PFT scores. Hence, there is no enough 
evidence to conclude significant results based on these statistics for PFT scores. 
Pro/Con marks are only assigned to enlisted personnel who have a rank of E4 and 
below. Also, the data for officers do not include information about the waiver status for 
officers, so the Pro/Con marks and waivers will only be discussed for enlisted personnel. 
The average proficiency marks for the full population is 43.62, and average conduct 
marks is 43.56 for enlisted Marines. Both the Pro/Con marks and the percentage of 
Marines who have waivers are higher for the non-attritted group than the attritted one. 
The differences are approximately 1 point for Pro/Con marks and 5 percentage points for 
waiver status. Hence, it can be concluded that higher Pro/Con marks and having any kind 
of waiver decrease the attrition probability of the enlisted personnel in the SMCR. 
3. Military Characteristics (Rank, Occupational Specialty) 
The job characteristics such as status, hardship the individual faces in the job, 
opportunities, and work environment affect the motivation, satisfaction, and performance 
of individuals and thus are important in an individual’s decision to stay in or leave the 
job. That is why pay grade and MOS category are included in the study to explain the 
relation between military characteristics and attrition. The attrition percentages of these 
categories are shown in Figures 27 through 30. 
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Figure 27.  MOS Percentages of Enlisted Personnel 
 


























Figure 29.  Rank Percentages of Enlisted Personnel 
 



























Rank seems to play important role for the attrition decisions of the both enlisted 
personnel and officers. For enlisted personnel, the effects of ranks differ significantly. 
While the percentage of Marines having a rank of E3 and below and E6 and above are 
higher in the attritted group than the non-attritted one, the effect reverses for the ranks of 
E4 and E5. The differences are 14, 23, and 8 percentage points for the ranks of E2, E3 
and E6 consecutively and 38 and 7 percentage points for E4 and E5. These statistics 
imply that having a rank of E4 and E5 decreases the attrition probability, while the other 
ranks are associated with higher attrition probabilities for the enlisted personnel in the 
SMCR. 
For the warrant officers, the effects are more consistent. The data includes very 
few officers who have the rank of W1. However, almost all other ranks for the warrant 
officers are associated with lower attrition rates. The percentages of officers who have the 
ranks of W2, W3, and W4 for non-attritted groups are greater than the attritted groups by 
2, 4, and 3 percentage points consecutively. However, the distribution of the officers who 
have the rank of W5 is perfect for both groups. These results suggest that having a rank 
of W2 through W4 decreases the attrition probability of the warrant officers in the 
SMCR. 
According to the statistics, the junior officers who have a rank of O3 and below 
have higher attrition probabilities, except the rank of O2 which has no difference between 
two groups, while the senior officers who have a rank of O4 and above experience lower 
attrition probabilities. The percentages of officers in the attritted group who have a rank 
of O1 and O3 are greater than the non-attritted group by 20 and 25 percentage points, 
successively. However, the O2s are distributed evenly between two groups. On the other 
hand, the percentages of officers in the non-attritted group who have a rank of O4, O5, 
and O6 are greater than the attritted group by 6, 19, and 10 percentage points 
consecutively. Based on these percentages, it can be concluded that junior officers have 
higher attrition probabilities, but as they get promoted this situation reverses. 
In the data set for the enlisted personnel, there is no Marines who have an aviation 
MOS. So, enlisted personnel are divided into two MOSs: combat and support. According 
to the descriptive statistics, the effect of MOSs on attrition has opposite effects on 
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attrition for each population but these effects are not considerably significant for both the 
officers and enlisted personnel. For example, thought the percentage of enlisted personnel 
who have combat MOS in the non-attritted group is higher than the attritted group, the 
difference is only 3 percentage points. The differences for officers are also very limited, 
only 1, 3, and 2 percentage points for the combat arms, aviation and support MOSs 
consecutively. In short, while having combat MOS decreases the attrition probability for 
the enlisted personnel, it increases the attrition probability for officers. Also for officers, 
aviators experience lower attrition probabilities as contrary to officers in the support 
units. But, the differences are small for both populations. 
4. Geographic Characteristics (Hometown, Unemployment Rate) 
Geographic characteristics of the places the reservists live vary across the United 
States. Support for military, civilian work environment, and patriotism are some 
examples of these characteristics. To control for these differences and to examine the 
effects of them are important to understand attrition behavior of the Marine Reservists. 
The attrition percentages of reservists’ hometowns for enlisted personnel and officers are 
shown in Figure 31 and Figure 32, respectively. 
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Figure 31.  Home of Record Regions’ Percentages of Enlisted Personnel 
 



























According to statistics, South Atlantic has the highest percentage for the enlisted 
personnel and officers for the full sample. The region which contributes the lowest 
number of Marines is New England for enlisted personnel and South East region for the 
officers. Almost all the numbers for the regions between attritted and non-attritted groups 
are distributed equally for both officers and enlisted personnel. With one exception, there 
is either no difference or only 1 percentage points between the groups. This exception is 
West Pacific region. For this region, non-attritted group is 3 percentage points higher 
than the attritted group for enlisted personnel which implies that Marines from that region 
experience lower attrition probabilities. 
Average unemployment rates of the hometown states of Marines at their attrition 
dates or MDPSDs are 7.28% and 6.36% for enlisted personnel and Marines, respectively. 
For both populations, this rate is higher for the non-attritted groups though the difference 
is smaller for the officers. Specifically the difference is 0.9 and 0.29 percentage points for 
enlisted Marines and officers. This finding suggests that higher unemployment rates are 
associated with the lower attrition probabilities for both populations. 
5. Fiscal Year Cohort (2001–2008 for Officers and 2001–2010 for 
Officers) 
Literature states that attrition decreased in post-9/11 era. To show whether this 
situation exists and continues, fiscal year cohort variables are included in the study. The 
attrition percentages of fiscal year cohort variables are shown in Figures 33 and 34. 
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Figure 33.  Cohort Percentages of Enlisted Personnel 
 






























Fiscal year cohorts provide consistent results for both the enlisted personnel and 
the officers. All the percentages with a few exceptions for both populations for the non-
attritted groups are higher than the attritted group by varying amounts between 6 and 1 
percentage points. The exceptions also distributed equally between attritted and non-
attritted groups rather than having percentages associated with higher attrition 
probabilities. This finding concludes that for each year more Marines are kept than 
attritted. Another finding for both populations is the behavior of the Marines from the 
year 2001 through 2010. While the percentages for the attritted and non-attritted groups 
for the enlisted personnel are stable for the beginning years, the percentages of the non-
attritted groups decrease while the same number increases for attritted groups towards the 
end. However, for the officers the situation reverses. Although the percentages of non-
attritted groups are relatively small in the beginning years, these numbers increase as time 
passes. These results signify that the attrition probability increases with the time for 
enlisted personnel, especially for the last fiscal years, while the same probability 
decreases for the officers. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics of variables. According to the 
findings in this chapter, being married is one factor which decreases the attrition 
probability in the SMCR. Besides marital status, age and having dependents are other 
factors which decrease the attrition probabilities for demographic category. Another 
significant result for this category is the finding that officers have considerably higher 
degrees of education than the enlisted personnel, as expected. Consistent with the 
literature, findings for hometown are not significant for this study either. But the 
unemployment rate numbers suggest that as unemployment rate increases, the attrition 
probability decreases as response. The findings for the AFQT scores are different for 
officers and enlisted personnel. While higher AFQT scores increases the attrition 
probabilities for officers, they decrease the same probabilities for the enlisted personnel. 
Having waiver and having higher Pro/Con marks are other factors which reduce the 
attrition probability for the enlisted personnel. For the military characteristics having a 
mid-rank for the enlisted personnel and having a senior rank for the officers decrease the 
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attrition probability as well. Finally, it is important to note that the attrition probability 
increases for the enlisted personnel as we move away from the FY01, while the same 
probability decreases for the officers. 
However, descriptive statistics in this chapter give a superficial understanding of 
factors that affect attrition and further analysis are needed to reach valid findings about 
attrition behaviors of the Marine Reservists in the SMCR. By using multivariate models 
and assessing the effects of the independent variables, one can better determine the 
causes of attrition. 
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V. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
A preliminary analysis based on only summary statistics does not provide sound 
and satisfactory results to answer the questions of this study. This chapter will introduce 
and discuss the models which are employed in this thesis to answer all of the questions of 
this study. Also the results of the multivariate models will be provided and discussed in 
detail in this chapter. 
A. MULTIVARIATE FRAMEWORK 
All the multivariate models we use in this study are probit regressions. This model 
is one of the most suitable models to analyze the binary dependent variables such as 
attrition. If a linear probability model is used for attrition, the probability that a Marine 
Reservist will attrit may not be between 0 and 1, according to the results. All the models 
which are employed in this study to explain the attrition behaviors of the Marine 




( 1| ) ( (Demographics) (Ability and Aptitude)
(Military Characteristics) (Geographic Characteristics) (FYCohorts))
P attrition X f   
  
    
   (1) 
The probit models used in this study provide the attrition probabilities of each 
enlisted Marine and officer reservists in the SMCR units based on the independent 
variables described in the previous chapters. These models will enable the opportunity to 
estimate the magnitude of change of the attrition probability for Marine Reservists by 
changing a specific independent variable one-unit while holding the all other independent 
variables constant. 
B. MODELS AND RESULTS 
This study will use two different multivariate models for the enlisted personnel 
and officers. In this section we present and discuss each model separately. The same steps 
and processes are followed for both of the models. The independent variables included in 
the models are presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7.   Independent Variables by Base and Regression Groups 
Category 
Enlisted Officer 
Regressed Base Group Regressed Base Group 
Demographics 
Gender Female Male Female Male 
Race White Non-white White Non-white 
Marital Status Married Divorced Single 
Married 
Divorced Single 
Dependents One or More Dependents 
No 
Dependents 




Age Age  Age  










Ability and Aptitude 
AFQT Scores AFQT score  - - 
PFT Scores 1
st Class Score 
2nd Class Score 
3rd Class 
Score 1
st Class Score 
2nd Class 
Score 
 3rd Class 
Score 















Officer 2 (W2) 
Chief Warrant 
Officer 3 (W3) 
Chief Warrant 
Officer 4 (W4) 
Chief Warrant 





































































Table 7 presents independent variables in two categories using different columns. 
First column provides the independent variables which are used in the multivariate 
model. The control group, which will be used to compare the effects of the variables in 
the regression, is presented in the second column. Because the number of Marines who 
have the rank of Warrant Officer (W1) for officers and E6 and above for enlisted 
personnel and the individuals who have the 2nd class marks for PFT test are very limited 
for the officer population, these categories are added to base group for the regression. 
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Also, the AFQT variable for the officers has 3,920 missing values which account for the 
72% of the entire data. To prevent these missing values from wasting that much of the 
data, the AFQT variable is excluded from the model for officers. 
For the region variables in the models, New England is chosen to be the control 
group for comparison with the other regions because the New England region is known to 
have the most educated population in the United States96 and is consequently considered 
to have the lowest attrition probability among the nine regions. 
1. Hypothesized Effects of Variables on Attrition 
We hypothesize that the independent variables we include in the models in this 
study are correlated with the attrition behaviors of the Marine reservists in the SMCR. 
Based on the previous studies and literature review, these expected effects are depicted in 
Table 8. The sign “-” means that the relevant variable is hypothesized to be negatively 
correlated with attrition. Alternatively, the sign “+” means that the variable is expected to 
be positively correlated. For example, being female is hypothesized to be negatively 
correlated with attrition probability. Other variables can be interpreted likewise. 
                                                 
96 Herschelman, “United States Marine Corps Reserve,” 44. 
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Gender Female - 





One or More 
Dependents 
+ 
Age Age - 
Education Level 





AFQT Scores AFQT Score - 
PFT Scores 
1st Class Score + 
2nd Class Score + 




E3 through E6 + 
W2 through W4 + 
O2 through O6 + 
Occupational 
Specialty 





All regions except 
New England 
- 
 Unemployment Rate Unemployment Rate + 
Fiscal Year 
Cohorts 
Fiscal Year Cohorts FY03 though FY10 - 
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2. Model for Enlisted Personnel 
a. Introduction of the Model 
The goal of this model is to examine and identify the causes of first-term attrition 
and the magnitude of these factors for the enlisted personnel in the SMCR. The data for 
this model includes 42,020 observations. Two models for the enlisted personnel are 
identified initially. While the first one included the Marine reservists whose PEBDs are 
before 2001 and after 2008, the second model was dropped these data. The first model is 
called “full sample model” and the second model is called “reduced model” to prevent 
the confusion. Then, two models were compared based on the criteria explained in Table 
9. The results of the comparison suggests there is significant change in the parameters 
mentioned previously and the reduced model which is thought to best reflect the intended 
population’s characteristics is used to predict the attrition behaviors of the enlisted 
Marines in the SMCR. Table 9 presents the comparison of both models. 
Table 9.   Comparison of Models for Enlisted Personnel 




R2 0.42 0.41 
Attrition Rate 44% 69% 
Misclassification Rate 17% 16% 
 
Because the observations which have the PEBD before 2001 and after 2008 are 
deleted from the data set, the reduced model includes fewer observations than the full 
sample model. Though this fact may seem disadvantageous for the reduced model, in fact 
it represents the population which this thesis aims to examine. The full sample model 
includes the enlisted Marines between the years 2009 and 2014. But these individuals do 
not have the chance to reach the end of the six-year period since the data ends at 2014. 
Hence, these enlisted Marines are considered as attrition by the model, because they have 
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fewer observations than six in the data set. As a result, regression group for the attrition 
variable, which should include only attritted Marines, includes non-attritted Marines also 
and this heterogeneous composition is compared with the non-attritted group. In other 
words, the Marines who should be in the base group are included in the regression group. 
This situation is obvious when the attrition rates of both models are compared. It is 44% 
for the reduced model and 69% for the full sample model. As explained in the first 
chapter, the attrition rate for the enlisted personnel is around 50% and this fact warrants 
the claim that reduced model is better at reflecting the attritted individuals in the data set. 
In short, though the full sample model includes more observations than the reduced 
model, it cannot distinguish the attritted enlisted Marines than the non-attritted ones and 
this creates considerable bias for the full sample model. 
R2 is the amount of the change in the dependent variable which is explained by 
the model. For example, 42% for the reduced model means that approximately one third 
of the changes in the attrition of enlisted Marine Reservists in the SMCR are explained 
by this model. Since the aim of this study is to explain the causes of attrition for the 
Marines in the SMCR, high rates of R2 is a very important feature of the models which 
will be employed in this study. So, we can say that the reduced model is superior to the 
full sample model, considering the higher R2 rate, although the difference is very small. 
However, one should keep in mind that by adding extra variables, the R2 rate can be 
increased. So, when comparing two models, we should be cautious about the R2 rate. 
Finally, we discuss prediction accuracy of both models before we decide which 
model to use. The misclassification rate is found to be 17% for the reduced model while 
the same number is 16% for the full sample model. Hence, we can conclude that none of 
the models have superiority over the other one based on the prediction accuracy. 
In summary, we can conclude that the reduced model is superior to the full 
sample model though it includes fewer observations and has slightly less prediction 
accuracy. Because, it represents the population better and has slightly higher R2 rate. 
Based on these findings, the reduced model is considered to be the best model to predict 
the attrition behaviors of the enlisted personnel in the SMCR and will be used in the 
multivariate models in the following sections. 
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In summary, the reduced model is superior to the full sample model though it 
includes fewer observations. It represents the population better, has higher R2 rate and 
prediction power and less insignificant independent variables. Based on these findings, 
the reduced model is considered to be the best model to predict the attrition behaviors of 
the enlisted personnel in the SMCR and will be used in the multivariate models in the 
following sections. 
b. Results of the Model 
Appendix B presents the parameters and the marginal effects of each independent 
variable for the model. There are 32 independent variables in the model and 21 of them 
are significant to the 95% level. As stated in the previous section, there are 16,420 
observations in the regression, and the R2 rate of the model is 42%. 
Because the dependent variable, which is attrition, is binary, marginal effects are 
used to explain the findings of the model for the enlisted personnel. At this point, it is 
important to keep in mind that when explaining the effect of an independent variable, 
other variables are held constant at their mean values. 
The independent variables in the model were tested and no multicollinearity was 
detected between the variables which need to be addressed. 
3. Model for Officers 
a. Introduction of the Model 
The aim of this model is to examine and identify the causes of first-term attrition 
and the magnitude of these factors for SMCR officers. The data consists of 5,410 
observations. As is the case for the enlisted personnel, two models are identified for the 
officers initially. While the first model includes all the observations in the data, the 
second model does not include the officers whose PEBDs are before 2001 and after 2010. 
The first model is called as “full sample model” and the second model is called as 
“reduced model.” Then, both of the models are regressed by using all of the usable 
variables achieved from the data. Two models are compared with each other by 
considering the criteria described in Table 10. Results of the models showed that there 
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are significant differences between the models and according to the parameters, reduced 
model is chosen to predict the causes of officer attrition in the SMCR.   
For the officers’ model, AFQT scores excluded from the regression. There were 
3,920 missing AFQT scores out of 5,410 observations, which accounts for the 72% of the 
data. This large amount prevents to infer meaningful results about AFQT variables from 
the data and by reducing the observation number, it does not reflect real values of other 
variables. Table 10 presents the comparison of both models. 
Table 10.   Comparison of Models for Officers 
Criteria Full Sample Model Reduced Model 
Number of 
Observations 4,014 504 
R2 0.40 0.54 
Attrition Rate 57% 49% 
Misclassification 
Rate 20% 15% 
 
The original data contains 5,410 SMCR officers, which is pretty small for an 
attrition study, when compared with the literature. Because of the missing values, this 
number drops to 504 for the reduced model which is too low and drops to 3,860 for the 
full sample model, which is still not enough but the best out of two. 
The R2 of the reduced model is higher than the rate of full sample model by 14 
percentage points. However, this value is related with observation number. The trails 
while building models suggested that the models with lower observation number have 
higher R2s. That is why the fact that reduced model has only 504 observations contributes 
to higher R2. This deemphasizes high R2 of reduced model. 
First-term attrition rate in the previous studies are around 50%. The attrition rates 
of the models are 57% for full sample model and 49% for reduced model. These rates are 
not only close to each other but also close to literature, that is why one cannot suggest 
one model is superior to other by looking at attrition rates. 
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Finally, misclassification rates of the both models are compared. Misclassification 
rate is found to be 15% for the reduced model and 20% for the full sample model which 
means that there is no significant difference between two models. 
In summary, the full sample model is considered to be superior to the reduced 
model because it has more observations and represents the officer population better, 
although it has a lower R2 and lower prediction accuracy. Based on these findings, the 
full sample model is considered to be the best model to predict the attrition behaviors of 
the SMCR officers and is used in the multivariate model. 
b. Results of the Model 
Appendix C presents the parameters and the marginal effects of each independent 
variable for the model. There are 36 independent variables in the model and 25 of them 
are significant to the 95% level. As stated previously, there are 4,014 observations in the 
regression and R2 rate of the model is 40% which means more than one third of the 
changes in the attrition is explained by this model. 
Because the dependent variable which is attrition is binary, marginal effects are 
used to explain the findings of the model for the officers. At this point it is important to 
keep in mind that when explaining the effect of an independent variable, other variables 
are held constant at their mean values. 
The independent variables in the model were tested and no multicollinearity was 
detected between the variables which need to be addressed. 
4. Analysis of the Results 
This section presents and discusses the findings of the models based on the five 
categories explained in previous chapters. Also, we compare the findings for the officers 
and enlisted personnel to identify the different effects of each variable on the attrition 
behaviors of each group. The possible reasons for the direction and the magnitude of the 
effects of variables will also be provided. However, the primary aim of this study is to 
determine the causes of attrition rather than explaining the reasons of them, so further and 
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more detailed research must be conducted to explain the actual results of each variable in 
this study. 
a. Effects of Demographics on Attrition 
Both models provide insignificant results for the gender effect on the attrition 
probability. Based on these results, it is not possible to make conclusions about being 
female or male on the attrition behavior the Marine Reservists. This finding may be the 
result of policies which are employed by the Marine Corps to employ more females in the 
units. 
Another variable which yields insignificant results is white. The literature 
concludes that blacks are more likely to attrit than whites. However, this situation has 
changed in recent studies, and recent results have insignificant and inconsistent findings 
for the race category. This situation may be the result of the atmosphere which was 
created by 9/11 or GWOT in American society and the recovering conditions of the U.S. 
economy. These events may fill the economic and demographic gaps between the racial 
groups in the U.S. and the race variable may have lost its importance as a determinant of 
attrition. 
Married enlisted personnel are more likely to attrit than single reservists 
according the results of the model. The marginal effect of married variable is 0.131 with 
the 99% significance level. This fact means that married enlisted Marines are more likely 
to attrit than single enlisted Marines by 13.1 percentage points. Being divorced also 
increases the attrition probability for the enlisted Marines by 16.5 percentage points with 
the same significance level. Considering the 44% attrition rate for the enlisted personnel, 
we can say that marital status variables have significant effect on the attrition behaviors 
of the Marine Reservists. The finding about the married Marines is consistent with the 
hypothesized effects for marital status. Being in the RC requires the Marines to 
participate in the monthly and annual trainings. Furthermore, there is always possibility 
to be deployed for the Marines in the RC and this situation creates more problems for the 
married Marines. These consequences of being a member of RC affects the married 
Marines more than the single ones. Contrary to literature, divorced Marines are found to 
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have more probability to attrit than singles also. Considering the emotional and monetary 
problems of being divorced, this result can be explained more easily. But it is difficult to 
make conclusions about the divorced Marines in this study because they constitute only 
the 3% of the entire data. The researches in the literature also have the same problems. 
For officers, the situation reverses. Married officers are less likely to attrit than 
single ones. The marginal effect of this variable is 0.363 with the 99% significance level. 
That means, contrary to enlisted personnel, married officers less likely to attrit than single 
ones by 36.3 percentage points. Similarly, being divorced also decreases the attrition 
probability for officers by 28 percentage points with 99% significance level. Because the 
attrition rate is 57% for the officers, these variables also have significant effect on the 
attrition decisions of the officer Marines. The average age for the married enlisted 
personnel is 26 years and is 40 years for the officers. Because the married officers are 
approximately 15 years older than enlisted personnel, they are more mature and their 
decisions tend to be more accurate. So, when they decide to join the RC, they know what 
they will face and how they will react. For example, they know that they may be 
deployed or mobilized and that the annual trainings may affect their lives, and they make 
their decisions accordingly. Hence, they are disappointed less, and attrition probabilities 
are lower for them. Although this may be an explanation for the adverse effects of marital 
status on both populations, further and more detailed research is needed to find the actual 
reasons of this difference. 
Having one or more dependents is positively associated with the attrition 
probabilities for the enlisted personnel. The marginal effect of having dependent is 0.097 
with the significance level of 99%. So, if an enlisted Marine has one or more dependents, 
the probability of attrition for that individual is 7.5 percentage points less than the 
enlisted Marines who have no dependents. The dependent effect is also considerable for 
attrition but not as significant as the marital status variables. This finding is consistent 
with the literature and hypothesized effect. Having dependents is an additional burden 
and responsibility for the people. While Marines without dependents may only consider 
their own future, the Marines who have dependents have to consider the fate of their 
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dependents also. Hence, this situation makes it harder for Marines with dependents to 
leave the SMCR and give up the additional income from being a Marine. 
However, the effect of dependent on attrition probability for the officers is 
negative. The marginal effect of dependent variable is 0.32 with the 99% significance 
level. That means having a dependent increases the attrition probability of an officer by 
32 percentage points. This effect also a significant effect for the attrition probability of 
the officers and the magnitude of this effect is similar to that of the marital status 
variables. The rate of officers who have above high school education is 94% while the 
same rate is 6% for the enlisted personnel. Based on this fact, it is possible that officers 
have better paying jobs than enlisted personnel and, if they have dependents, they can 
more easily give up their position in the RC to spend time with their dependents and 
enjoy their leisure time since they can compensate the loss caused by leaving the RC with 
their civilian job. 
Age is another factor for enlisted personnel that is associated with lower attrition 
probability. The marginal effect of age is 0.057 for the enlisted Marines in the SMCR 
with the 99% significance level. Considering that the average age is 25 for the enlisted 
Marines, each additional age above 25 decreases the attrition probability of that 
individual by 5.1 percentage points. But compared to other variables and the attrition rate 
for enlisted personnel, we can conclude that age has a relatively small effect on attrition. 
The finding about age contradicts the hypothesized effect. Literature suggests that 
because people get more mature with age, they have a greater chance to find better 
working opportunities in the civilian markets and that increases the attrition probability. 
However, as you spend more time in a job, you gain experience specific to that job and 
usually most of this experience is non-transferrable to other areas. Also if an individual is 
relatively older, it is possible that the employer will not be able to employ that person as 
long as a younger one and that decreases the chances of elder enlisted Marines to find 
satisfying jobs in the civilian markets. Furthermore, as a person stays longer in a job, the 
pay increases in accordance with the person’s tenure. Also, older people have bigger 
families to look after, kids in college, and so forth, so they need more money than the 
younger people and do not want to lose the additional income that the SMCR affiliation 
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provides. These facts make it harder for the relatively older people to quit their current 
jobs, or the SMCR in the case of our study, than for the younger individuals. 
For officers also, age decreases the probability of attrition. The marginal effect of 
age is 0.011 with 99% significance level, which means that each additional year 
decreases the attrition possibility of the officers by 1.1 percentage points. But this effect 
is also very small compared to other variables in the officers’ model. In fact, the age 
variable has the smallest effect on the attrition probability for the officers. 
For enlisted Marines, higher education levels are associated with a higher attrition 
probability. The marginal effect of the variable for the Marines who have above high 
school level of education is 0.31 with the 99% significance level. So, having education 
above the level of high school increases the attrition probability of the enlisted Marines 
by 31 percentage points. Because the attrition rate is 44% for this population, education 
level has great effect on the attrition decisions of the enlisted Marines. This finding is 
also not consistent with the hypothesized effects. It was decided that higher educated 
Marines will be more loyal to their jobs and make more accurate decisions and 
predictions about their lives, so their attrition probabilities would be less. However, the 
U.S. economy is recovering and the unemployment rates are decreasing steadily. This 
situation makes it easier for educated people to find better jobs in the civilian markets. 
Marines in the SMCR can work in civilian jobs while participating in trainings in their 
units. However, as they make more money in the outside, they will no longer want to lose 
their leisure time by participating in trainings in the weekends. Also while in the SMCR, 
they always have the probability of being deployed overseas. Deployment will cause 
them to lose significant income from their civilian jobs. Besides, if they are making 
satisfying money in their civilian jobs, they will not want to experience the problems of 
deployment. These facts explain the negative effect of education on the attrition 
probability of the enlisted Marines in the SMCR. 
Education increases the attrition probabilities of officers also. The marginal effect 
of the variable for the officers who have above high school education level is 0.179 with 
99% significance level. Hence, compared to the officers who have high school and below 
level, these officers are more likely to attrit by 17.9 percentage points for the reasons 
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mentioned for the enlisted personnel. Based on the average attrition rate of 57% for the 
officers, we can say that education has moderate effect on the attrition decisions of the 
officers. 
b. Effects of Ability and Aptitude on Attrition 
According to results of the model for enlisted personnel, higher AFQT scores 
decrease the attrition probability of the Marine Reservists in the SMCR. But the 
magnitude of the change is very small compared to mean attrition rate for the enlisted 
personnel. In fact, among the independent variables, AFQT score has the lowest effect on 
attrition probability for the enlisted Marines. The marginal effect of the variable for the 
above average AFQT scores is 0.001 with the 99% confidence level which means one 
additional AFQT score decreases the attrition probability by 0.1 percentage point. This 
result contradicts to the hypothesized effects for AFQT variable. So, it can be concluded 
that the Marines who have high scores from the AFQT scores are more loyal to the 
USMC RC and they assume the military lifestyle more than other reservists. Although 
this suggestion contradicts the theory that the U.S. economy is recovering and that there 
is a higher demand in the civilian sector for educated people, the AFQT scores neither 
reflect the education level of the individuals nor present the real condition of the people 
when they attritted or completed their contracts since AFQT test is taken before 
admission to the U.S. military. So the AFQT scores of the individuals in their first 
records are used for the enlisted model which reflects the condition of the enlisted 
Marines when they entered the military. Besides, it is possible that regardless of their 
education status, people may get high scores to join the military if they really want to be a 
soldier and stay in the military. However, one should keep in mind that the effect of the 
AFQT score on the attrition probability is almost insignificant in terms of magnitude. 
PFT is another category the findings of which contradict to the hypothesized 
effects. Having a PFT 1st and 2nd class scores rather than 3rd class increases the attrition 
probability of the enlisted Marines. The marginal effects of these variables are 0.186 and 
0.082 consecutively with 99% significance level. The interpretation of these numbers is 
that the Marines who have the PFT score of 1st and 2nd class are more likely to attrit than 
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the Marines who have 3rd class PFT scores by 18.6 and 8.2 percentage points. As can be 
seen from the coefficients, the probability increases in accordance with the scores. This 
finding is another evidence that the more able and educated people have better 
opportunities in the civilian markets and as the economy gets better the attrition rates for 
these Marine reservists increases. Compared to mean attrition rate for the enlisted 
personnel which is 44%, we can conclude that 2nd class scores have relatively low effect 
on attrition while the 1st class scores have more significant effect. 
For the officers, however, 1st class PFT scores are associated with lower attrition 
probabilities. The marginal effect for this variable is 0.109 with 99% significance level 
which means having 1st class score for PFT for an officer decreases the probability of 
attrition by 10.9 percentage points. Because the attrition rate is 57% for the officer 
Marine Reservists, PFT scores have relatively low effect on the attrition behavior of the 
officers. Contrary to enlisted personnel and in accordance with the literature, high PFT 
scores may signify dedication of officers to their duty while this may not be the case for 
the enlisted personnel. Because the average age for the enlisted personnel is 
approximately 10 years younger than the officers and the standards are higher for 
younger individuals to get 1st Class marks in the PFT, these physically more able 
individuals may be demanded more in the civilian markets, especially for jobs requiring 
human power. So while the 1st class PFT score is a negative factor for enlisted personnel, 
it decreases the attrition probability for officers in the SMCR. 
Since Pro/Con marks have statistically insignificant results because they have 
high P values, the last variable under this category is the waiver and, contrary to the 
hypothesized effect, having a waiver has positive effects on the attrition behaviors of the 
enlisted Marine reservists. The marginal effect of the waiver variable is 0.029 with the 
significance level of 95%. So, having any kind of waiver decreases the attrition 
probability of the Marine Reservists by 2.9 percentage points. It is possible that these 
Marines had problems finding jobs in the civilian sector and after being admitted to the 
military with a waiver, they do not want to lose their current status in the USMC. That is 
probably why the enlisted Marines with waivers are less likely to attrit than the Marines 
with no waivers. However, compared to other variables and the mean attrition rate for the 
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enlisted personnel, waiver is among the variables with the lowest effect on attrition 
probability. 
c. Effects of Military Characteristics on Attrition 
Rank is associated with lower attrition probability for the enlisted Marine 
Reservists in the SMCR except E5s. The marginal effects of rank variables are 0.234, 
0.723, and 0.355 for the Marines who have the rank of E3, E4, and E5, successively, with 
the 99% significance level. So Marines who have ranks of E3 and E4 have less 
probability of attritting than Marines who have a rank of E2 and below by 23.4 and 72.3 
percentage points. This finding is consistent with the hypothesized effect for this variable. 
The Marines who enjoy the military lifestyle tend to stay in the military longer periods 
than those who do not enjoy and they are promoted in the Marine Corps. However, 
having the rank of E5 increases the attrition probability by 35.5 percentage points. This 
may result from the fact that more experienced Marines are in high demand in the outside 
and some of them want to evaluate these opportunities in the later ranks. It is important to 
note that, together with education category, rank variables have the greatest effect on the 
attrition behavior of the enlisted reservists. 
Similar to enlisted Marines, rank is associated with lower attrition probability for 
the officers in the SMCR. Compared to Second Lieutenant (O1), all other ranks have less 
probability to leave the SMCR by varying percentage points between 99.5 (for Captain) 
and 78.6 (Chief Warrant Officer 5) with the significance level of 99%. Though this is the 
case for the officers, there is no steady increase or decrease through the ranks for officers. 
But similar to enlisted Marines, rank category has the greatest effect on the attrition 
decision of the officers in the SMCR. 
According to the results, being in a combat unit rather than a support one 
increases the attrition probability for the enlisted Marines. Since there are no enlisted 
Marines in the aviation units according to the data set, only the combat and support units 
are compared with each other. The marginal effect of combat unit variable is 0.038 with 
the 99% significance level. That means the enlisted Marines in the combat units are 3.8 
percentage points more likely to attrit than the individuals in the support units. This 
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finding is also consistent with the hypothesized effects and the literature. Since the 
conditions in the combat units are demanding and the probability of participating in a 
combat and being deployed to hostile areas is higher for these units, it is likely that 
attrition probabilities in these units are higher than the support units. However, the effect 
of this variable is relatively low compared to other variables and 44% attrition rate of 
enlisted Marines. 
For officers, being in the aviation units increases the attrition probability, while 
being in the combat units has the opposite effect. The marginal effect for the aviation 
variable is 0.058 with 95% significance level, while the same number is 0.038 for the 
combat variable with the 95% significance level. It is possible that officers who are in the 
aviation units have capabilities that are in high demand in the civilian aviation companies 
and this fact increases the attrition probability for the aviator officers by 5.8 percentage 
points. Being in a combat unit, however, decreases the attrition probability by 3.8 
percentage points contrary to enlisted personnel. Officers are leaders in the military and 
this role is assumed only in the combat units. If a person wants to be an officer and lead 
other Marines in the USMC, that individual should join the combat units to satisfy this 
goal. Hence, being in a combat unit is associated with lower attrition probability for the 
officers as opposed to enlisted Marines. But together with age, unit type variables have 
the smallest effect on the attrition decision of the officers in the SMCR. 
d. Effects of Geographic Characteristics on Attrition 
For enlisted personnel, only one variable has a statistically significant result and 
all other marginal effects for region variables are insignificant. The marginal effect of 
Midwest West region is 0.072 with 99% significance level. That means that enlisted 
Marines from that region are 7.2 percentage points less likely to attrit than the Marines 
from New England. The effect of this region is moderate considering the 44% attrition 
rate of enlisted personnel in the SMCR. Contrary to hypothesized effect, this region is 
associated with lower attrition probability compared to New England Region. But, since 
the higher levels of education are found to increase the attrition probability, this result is 
consistent with the findings of the models in this study. 
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Similar to enlisted personnel, none of the variables for the region in the model for 
officers provided statistically significant results. Having insignificant results for regions 
of the Marines is the general problem for the literature also. Almost all findings about the 
region for attrition studies are mixed, inconsistent or insignificant. 
The unemployment rate is associated with the lower attrition probability for the 
enlisted personnel and the marginal effect of this variable is 0.038 with the significance 
level of 99%. Hence, the interpretation for this variable is one point increase in the 
unemployment rate of the hometown of the Marine, decreases the attrition probability of 
that individual by 3.8 percentage points. This result is consistent with the hypothesized 
effects and the literature. High unemployment rates signify that the economy is in 
recession and it is hard to find a job in the civilian sector. So, enlisted Marines in the 
SMCR decide to stay in the RC and that decisions decrease the attrition probability in the 
SMCR. However, one should keep in mind that considering the magnitude of the 
marginal effect, this variable has relatively small effect on the attrition probability of the 
Marine Reservists. For officers, the unemployment variable did not provide statistically 
significant results since the P value is greater than 0.05. 
e. Effects of Fiscal Year Cohorts on Attrition 
Lastly, the effects of joining the RC in different years will be discussed in this 
section. All the marginal effects for the FY03 through FY08 for enlisted personnel varies 
between 12.4 and 19.6 and are associated with lower attrition probability compared to the 
FY02 with significance levels of 99%. This result contradicts the hypothesized effect for 
this variable. It is possible that during the following years after 9/11 and the declaration 
of GWOT, patriotism and the rage of the U.S. society were high, and this situation was 
reinforced with new events and threats in the world. This situation in the world and 
United States kept the attrition rates low for the years following 2002. Although the 
coefficients change as they move away from the FY03, they still have positive effects on 
the attrition rates. The magnitude of the marginal effects suggests that these variables 
have a considerable effect on the attrition rates of the enlisted Marines compared to 44% 
attrition rate. 
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For the officers, the results are the same. All the years after 2002 are associated 
with lower attrition probabilities with varying marginal effects between 16.5 and 64.6, 
which means attrition probabilities are lower for these years. Further, the marginal effects 
are increasing with time, possibly for the reasons explained for the enlisted personnel. 
Fiscal year cohort variables also have a significant effect on the attrition behavior of the 
officers compared to the 57% attrition rate. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduces the models for the officers and enlisted personnel in the 
SMCR and explains them in detail. Also, it presents and discusses the findings of the 
each model. The model for the enlisted personnel suggests that being married or divorced 
and having above high school level of education are related with higher attrition 
probability for the enlisted Marines in the demographics category. Similarly, having high 
scores for the PFT and being in a combat unit increase the attrition probability. On the 
other hand, having a dependent, higher age, higher AFQT scores, having a waiver, being 
in the higher ranks, and unemployment rate are found to decrease the attrition probability 
for the enlisted personnel in the SMCR. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that 
ranks and education has the greatest effect on the attrition behavior of the enlisted 
Marines while the AFQT scores and waiver have the lowest effect. 
The model for the officers also provided some interesting findings about the 
attrition behaviors of the Marine Reservists. For example, having a dependent, having 
education level above high school, and being in an aviation unit are the factors which 
increase the attrition probability. But being married, higher age, having 1st class PFT 
scores, being a higher rank, and being in a combat unit are found to decrease the attrition 
probability for the officers. For the officers also, rank has the greatest effect on the 
attrition probability while the age and the unit type variables have the lowest effects. 
The comparison of models with each other suggested that some variables have 
different effects on each population. For example, being married is associated with higher 
attrition probability for the enlisted personnel while it decreases the attrition probability 
of officers. Higher PFT scores and being in a combat unit are other variables which have 
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the opposite results for each population. Similarly, having a dependent decreases the 
attrition probability of the enlisted Marines while it has the opposite effect for the 
officers.  
Not all of the variables were found to have significant effects on the attrition 
probability as hypothesized in this chapter. For example, race, hometown, and gender 
categories did not provide significant results for both models. Further, the unemployment 
rate for officers has statistically insignificant results, while the Pro/Con marks have the 
same problem for enlisted personnel. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The primary aim of this research is to identify the determinants of first-term 
attrition for enlisted personnel and officers in the SMCR. Also, this study aims to find 
how first-term attrition factors differ between officers and enlisted personnel. Numerous 
variables are examined in this study to find causes of attrition. These variables are 
categorized under five headings: demographics, ability and aptitude, military 
characteristics, geographic characteristics, and fiscal year cohorts. 
As discussed in the first chapter, attrition is a serious problem for the Marine 
Corps. Attrition through losses of experienced personnel increases costs and has an 
adverse effect on Marine Corps readiness. The research specifically examines the SMCR 
portion of the RC which is structured under the Ready Reserve/SelRes. The majority of 
the SelRes are affiliated with the units in the SMCR. Additionally, Marine Reservists 
conduct their monthly and annual trainings in SMCR units. Contrary to other Ready 
Reserve structures which include individual Marines, the SMCR consists of regular units. 
Because most of the enlisted Marines are contracted with 6x2-year type contracts, this 
group was selected as the study population. The same situation is true for officers’ 4x4-
year contract types. The attrition rate for enlisted personnel is 44%, while it is 57% for 
officers in the SMCR. 
The data for the enlisted personnel and officers in the SMCR was provided by 
Headquarters Marine Corps, Manpower & Reserve Affairs, and the unemployment rates 
for the years 2001 through 2014 were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
website. The data for both populations include annual snapshots of each Marine 
Reservist. The number of observations is approximately 500,000 for enlisted personnel 
and 50,000 for officers. The data is cleaned, coded, and reshaped to keep only the first 
and last observations for each Marine. Finally, according to the nature of the variable, the 
first or last information for each variable category is retained to reach only one record for 
every individual in the data set. These steps made it possible to use each data set in the 
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multivariate models and provided the basis for determining whether the individual stayed 
in the SMCR six years or more to create the dependent variable, which is attrition. 
As explained in detail in Chapter V, two separate models were created for the 
enlisted personnel and officers. To reach final models for each population, two draft 
models were initially identified. The first model was a reduced model which only 
included enlisted Marines who entered the RC after 2001 and before 2008, and before 
2010 for officers. The second model is a full sample model that included all Marines in 
the data set. These two models were compared with each other and finally a reduced 
model for enlisted personnel and full sample model for officers were found to be the best 
model to predict attrition probabilities for each population. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. What Factors are Correlated with First-Term Attrition for Reserve 
Enlisted Marines? 
a. Conclusion 
Most of the variables for the enlisted personnel were found to have significant 
effects on the attrition behavior of the Marine reservists. The demographics for being 
married or divorced and having education above high school level are the factors which 
increase the attrition probability while having dependent and age decreases it. The 
findings about being divorced, age, and education level differ from the literature. 
Divorced Marines constitute a little portion of the data similar to other studies. So, it is 
not appropriate to make conclusions based on the findings for such a community. The 
differences for age and education level are assessed to stem from the change in the U.S. 
economy and the different decisions by demographic groups. Compared to other 
variables and the 44% attrition rate for the enlisted personnel in the SMCR, we can 
conclude that age has the lowest effects on the attrition probability while the effect of 
education is the highest and marital status and dependents have moderate effect on 
attrition probability for the demographics category. 
For the ability and aptitude, higher AFQT scores and having a waiver are 
associated with lower attrition probabilities, but higher PFT scores were found to increase 
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attrition probability. For this category, results about AFQT and PFT scores contradict the 
literature. These results are also considered to be associated with the changing dynamics 
in the U.S. economy. But, one should keep it in mind that AFQT scores do not reflect the 
actual and current ability and aptitude of individuals. AFQT scores and having a waiver 
have low effects on the attrition probability for the enlisted personnel while the PFT 
scores have a moderate effect. In fact, AFQT scores have the lowest effect on attrition 
probability of enlisted personnel among the all variables in the model. 
Rank and the unit type are two subsections under the military characteristics 
category. Higher ranks have a positive effect on the attrition probability, but being in a 
combat unit was found to increase the attrition probability. While the unit type variables 
have relatively low effect on attrition behavior of enlisted Marines, rank has the greatest 
effect on the attrition probability among the all variables in the model.  
For geographic characteristics category, higher unemployment rates are found to 
decrease the attrition probability of Marine Reservists but its effect is relatively low 
compared to other variables.  
The last category is the fiscal year category, and all the years after 2002 were 
found to decrease the attrition probability for the enlisted personnel though there is no 
increase and decrease throughout the years. Fiscal year cohort variables also have a 
moderate effect on the attrition probability of the enlisted Marines in terms of the 
magnitude of their marginal effects. 
b. Recommendations 
Some findings had greater effects on attrition probability while others were 
negligible or insignificant. Hence, the recommendations in this section only include areas 
which have larger effects for cost efficiency. The largest effect belongs to education 
level, above high school level graduates, for the enlisted personnel. Also, having high 
PFT scores have significant negative effect on attrition probability. M&RA should 
establish policy to keep these more able enlisted personnel in the RC. Being married and 
divorced are also significant factors that increase the attrition probability. When 
recruiting personnel, the Marine Corps should target single individuals to decrease the 
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attrition probability. Finally, as long as enlisted personnel stay in the efficient range, 
Marine Corps may enlist older individuals in the RC. 
2. What Factors are Correlated with First-Term Attrition for Marine 
Reserve Officers? 
a. Conclusion 
Being married and higher age decreases the attrition probabilities for Marine 
Officers while having dependents and higher education levels increase the probability. 
Marital status and having dependents contradict previous findings for the enlisted 
demographics category. The data attributes the differences between the populations to be 
caused by the older ages and higher education levels of officers. When compared to a 
57% attrition rate for SMCR officers, demographic variables have a moderate or low 
effect on the attrition probability. For example, age has the lowest effect on the attrition 
probability while all other variables have moderate effects.  
Only the PFT score variable for the ability and aptitude category is included in the 
model for officers and, as opposed to enlisted personnel, higher PFT scores were found to 
decrease the attrition probability for this population. This finding is also considered to be 
the result of older ages of officers. The effect of PFT scores is also low compared to other 
variables in the model.  
For the military characteristics category, higher ranks and being in a combat unit 
are associated with lower attrition probability while being in an aviation unit increases 
the attrition possibility. There is an interesting difference between officers and enlisted 
personnel. While being in a combat unit increases the attrition probability for enlisted 
personnel, it has the opposite effect for the officers. This difference is assessed to be the 
result of officers’ leadership roles. Rank variables have the greatest effect on the attrition 
behavior of SMCR officers, but the effects of unit types are assessed to be low.  
Fiscal year cohorts are found to decrease the attrition probability for the officers. 
Besides, increasing marginal effects as they move away from the year 2002 indicate that 
the attrition probability decreases for the officers as time passes. Fiscal year cohort 
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variables have a significant effect on the attrition probability of the officers since their 
marginal effects are close to the officers’ attrition rates. 
b. Recommendations 
The Marine Corps should recruit married officers to decrease officer attrition 
probability. Since having a dependent and higher education level are significant factors 
which increase attrition probability, policy-makers should devise policies to keep the 
officers who have dependents and who have high education levels in the RC. For 
example, additional bonuses or incentives may be offered to highly educated officers and 
to the individuals who have dependents. 
3. How Do First-Term Attrition Factors Differ between Officers and 
Enlisted Personnel? 
a. Conclusions 
Some independent variables included in the models for each population have 
different effects. For example, being married is associated with a higher attrition 
probability for enlisted personnel while it decreases the attrition probability of officers. 
Similarly, having a higher PFT score or being in a combat unit has the opposite results 
for each population since they are associated with a higher attrition probability for 
officers and a lower probability for enlisted personnel. However, having dependents has 
different adverse effects, because it decreases the attrition probability of the enlisted 
Marines while it has the opposite effect for the officers. 
b. Recommendations 
Because enlisted personnel and officers are different populations which include 
different individuals who have different characteristics, their attrition behaviors are 
different also. So an M&RA policy which decreases the attrition probability in one 
population may not be useful in the other population. Policy-makers should examine each 
population based on its own characteristics and employ the policies afterwards. 
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C. FOR FUTURE WORK 
There are some limitations in this study which affect the predictive accuracy of 
the multivariate models for enlisted personnel and officers. These drawbacks will be 
explained in this study to provide suggestions to future studies on attrition. 
The first limitation is the limited number of observations in the officer data set. 
While the observation number is 500,000 for the enlisted personnel, this number is only 
50,000 for the officer. Once the data is cleaned and coded, only 3,860 observations 
remained for the multivariate model. Though this number is sufficient to predict results, 
additional observations in the data set would increase the significance of the results and 
predictive ability of the model. 
Another limitation which affects both models is the identification of the attrition 
variable. The binary variable for attrition for this study is calculated for each individual 
by examining the number of observations in the data sets because there was no 
information about the individuals regarding their attrition status and many data fields 
included inconsistent values or were left blank. If enlisted personnel and officers have 
less than six or four observations in the data, respectively, they are considered as attrition. 
So, future studies should obtain the data exact information about the attrition status or 
correct and consistent information for the data fields. 
This study aims to identify as many causes of attrition as possible. Hence, high R2 
is very important for the multivariate models in this research. The enlisted attrition model 
is 0.42 and 0.40 for the officer model. Though these numbers are pretty high to explain 
the causes of attrition, additional variables will increase them even further. These 
additional variables may include deployment status, unit location, and so forth. 
Though this study provides significant and valuable findings for the policy-
makers in the USMC, further research and analysis should be conducted to implement or 
change any policy regarding the manpower issues in the RC. 
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D. FOR TURKEY 
Turkish Armed Forces consists of Army, Navy, Air Force, Gendarmerie, and 
Coast Guard. There are no Turkish Armed Forces similar to the USMC. Turkish Army 
and operational units of Turkish Gendarmerie are similar to the USMC in the context of 
missions, such as fighting on the front line. 
The U.S. active military operates in various parts of the world, especially in the 
Middle East, which is one of the most unstable regions of the world. That is why the U.S. 
military is thought to be one of the most powerful militaries in the world. The region 
surrounding Turkey is an unstable region too. Ongoing internal wars in Syria and Iraq, 
conflicts between Palestine and Israel, nuclear studies of Iran, conflicts between Russia 
and Ukraine, and tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan affect Turkey. Additionally, 
Turkey itself also has an ongoing fight against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya 
Karkeren Kurdistane – PKK) terrorists. That is why Turkey has to maintain a strong 
military. 
The Turkish military has about 675,000 personnel, a large portion of which is 
composed of officers, noncommissioned officers, and conscripts. Regular officers and 
noncommissioned officers attend military schools and have a 10-year military service 
obligation after graduation. Conscripts are Turkish citizens who are fulfilling their 12-
month compulsory military service at the age of 20. Other than these personnel, the 
remaining staff consists of contracted personnel (contract officers, contract 
noncommissioned officers, contract sergeants, and contract privates). 
The Turkish military has emphasized professionalism in recent years and replaced 
some of the conscript units which fight against PKK with sergeants and privates who are 
contracted. The compulsory military service for conscriptions has been shortened from 18 
months to 12 months gradually. Similarly, Turkey started to recruit contracted officers 
and contract noncommissioned officers to meet low-rank personnel needs and shortened 
the compulsory regular officers’ and noncommissioned officers’ military service from 15 
years to 10 years. These changes are part of the steps toward transforming to an all-
volunteer force. 
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The shorter compulsory military service for regular officers and 
noncommissioned officers, and more contracted personnel has caused attrition to become 
a more significant problem than it has ever been for Turkey. This study can be beneficial 
to Turkey to examine attrition utilizing the models from this research with Turkish data.  
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FULL SAMPLE, 
ATTRITTED AND NON-ATTRITTED OF ENLISTED AND 
OFFICER RESERVISTS 












Observations 42,020 18,564 23,456 5,410 3,098 2,312 
Attrition 0.44 1.00 0.00 0.57 1.00 0.00 
 (0.49) (0) (0) (0.49) (0) (0) 
Gender       
Female 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) 
Male 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) 
Race       
White 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.91 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) 
Non-white 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.09 
 (0.33) (0.35) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) 
Marital Status       
Single 0.67 0.70 0.65 0.41 0.60 0.16 
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.36) 
Married 0.30 0.27 0.32 0.53 0.36 0.77 
 (0.45) (0.44) (0.46) (0.49) (0.47) (0.42) 
Divorced 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.07 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.23) (0.20) (0.25) 
Dependent 0.33 0.29 0.36 0.69 0.60 0.81 
 (0.47) (0.45) (0.48) (0.46) (0.48) (0.39) 
Age 25.13 24.15 25.91 36.68 33.21 41.32 
 (3.17) (3.42) (2.71) (8.32) (7.48) (7.03) 
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Variable ENLISTED OFFICER 
Education 
HS_grad 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.05 0.03 0.07 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.17) (0.26) 
More_HS 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.95 0.97 0.93 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.21) (0.17) (0.26) 
AFQT Scores 65.06 62.45 67.10 81.34 82.15 80.10 
 (19.2) (19.3) (18.9) (13.2) (12.6) (13.8) 
PFT Scores       
Pft_1st 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.92 0.92 0.91 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) 
Pft_2nd 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.08 0.07 0.08 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) 
Pft_3rd 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Pro/Con Marks       
Pros 43.62 43.02 44.07    
 (3.04) (3.74) (2.29)    
Cons 43.56 42.88 44.06    
 (3.19) (4.01) (2.29)    
Waiver 0.18 0.15 0.20    
 (0.38) (0.36) (0.39)    
Ranks       
E2 0.08 0.16 0.02    
 (0.26) (0.36) (0.12)    
E3 0.27 0.40 0.17    
 (0.44) (0.49) (0.37)    
E4 0.33 0.11 0.49    
 (0.46) (0.31) (0.49)    
E5 0.25 0.21 0.28    
 (0.43) (0.40) (0.44)    
E6 0.08 0.12 0.04    
 (0.26) (0.32) (0.20)    
W1    0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Variable ENLISTED OFFICER 
    (0.05) (0.06) (0) 
W2    0.03 0.02 0.04 
    (0.16) (0.14) (0.20) 
W3    0.03 0.01 0.05 
    (0.16) (0.10) (0.21) 
W4    0.02 0.01 0.04 
    (0.15) (0.12) (0.18) 
W5    0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) 
O1    0.12 0.20 0.00 
    (0.32) (0.40) (0.02) 
O2    0.06 0.06 0.06 
    (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
O3    0.30 0.40 0.15 
    (0.45) (0.49) (0.36) 
O4    0.20 0.18 0.24 
    (0.40) (0.38) (0.42) 
O5    0.16 0.08 0.27 
    (0.36) (0.26) (0.44) 
O6    0.07 0.03 0.13 
    (0.25) (0.16) (0.33) 
Occupational Specialty       
Combat_mos 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.35 0.35 0.34 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) 
Aviation_mos    0.18 0.17 0.20 
    (0.38) (0.37) (0.40) 
Support_mos 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.47 0.48 0.46 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
Home Location       
Home_midwesteast 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Home_midwestwest 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
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Variable ENLISTED OFFICER 
Home_newengland 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) 
Home_midatlantic 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Home_southatlantic 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.21 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) 
Home_southeast 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
Home_southeastcentral 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.12 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) 
Home_westmountain 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) 
Home_westpacific 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.16 
 (0.37) (0.35) (0.38) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) 
Unemp 7.28 6.78 7.68 6.36 6.24 6.53 
 (2.24) (2.21) (2.19) (1.70) (1.62) (1.78) 
Fiscal Year Cohorts       
FY02 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.06 
 (0.32) (0.28) (0.35) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) 
FY03 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.33) (0.29) (0.35) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) 
FY04 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.33) (0.29) (0.35) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) 
FY05 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 (0.32) (0.29) (0.35) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) 
FY06 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.03 0.05 
 (0.33) (0.30) (0.35) (0.18) (0.16) (0.21) 
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Variable ENLISTED OFFICER 
FY07 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.05 
 (0.32) (0.29) (0.34) (0.18) (0.16) (0.21) 
FY08 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.07 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.21) (0.16) (0.26) 
FY09    0.06 0.04 0.07 
    (0.22) (0.19) (0.26) 
FY10    0.06 0.03 0.09 
    (0.23) (0.18) (0.29) 
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APPENDIX B. RESULTS OF THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL MODEL 




Attrition     
    
Dependent Variables 
Female 0.040* 0.105* 
[0.024] [0.062] 
White 0.012 0.033 
[0.015] [0.039] 
Married 0.131*** 0.340*** 
[0.025] [0.065] 
Divorced 0.165*** 0.421*** 
[0.035] [0.088] 
Dependent -0.097*** -0.262*** 
[0.023] [0.063] 






AFQT -0.001*** -0.002*** 
[0.000] [0.001] 








Pros 0.005 0.013 
[0.004] [0.011] 
Cons -0.005 -0.014 
[0.004] [0.011] 
Waiver -0.029** -0.077** 
[0.013] [0.035] 
E3 -0.234*** -0.650*** 
[0.025] [0.074] 
E4 -0.723*** -2.241*** 
[0.017] [0.078] 
E5 0.355*** 0.924*** 
[0.048] [0.141] 
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VARIABLES MARGINAL EFFECTS 
PROBIT 
COEFFICIENTS 
Combat Unit 0.038*** 0.100*** 
[0.010] [0.027] 
Mid Atlantic 0.017 0.045 
[0.024] [0.062] 
Midwest East 0.040* 0.106* 
[0.023] [0.061] 
Midwest West -0.072*** -0.199*** 
[0.027] [0.077] 
South Atlantic -0.017 -0.044 
[0.022] [0.060] 






West Mountain 0.026 0.068 
[0.028] [0.073] 






FY03 -0.196*** -0.573*** 
[0.013] [0.045] 
FY04 -0.183*** -0.531*** 
[0.015] [0.049] 
FY05 -0.157*** -0.449*** 
[0.016] [0.050] 
FY06 -0.167*** -0.479*** 
[0.016] [0.050] 
FY07 -0.166*** -0.475*** 
[0.015] [0.048] 
FY08 -0.124*** -0.347*** 
[0.016] [0.047] 
Observations 16,420 
Pseudo R2 42% 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C. RESULTS OF THE OFFICERS MODEL 




Attrition     



























































































































Pseudo R2 40% 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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